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EXTRA-LEGAL INFLUENCES, GROUP PROCESSES,
AND JURY DECISION-MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*
DAVID T.

WASSERMAN**

J. NEIL ROBINSONt

Observers of our legal system have long been impressed with the
willingness of American litigants to turn over important and complicated disputes to groups of conscripted laymen.' Two aspects of the
jury have been an enduring source of interest to its critics and defenders. The first is the sensitivity of lay decision-makers to concerns that
are officially irrelevant to the resolution of the case: the personal and
equitable factors of which the applicable law takes no account. At best,
this sensitivity is displayed in the conscientious refusal of juries to enforce unreasonable laws or rules of evidence through the act of jury
nullification.2 At worst, this sensitivity manifests itself in harsh or capricious decisions based on legally and morally irrelevant factors as, for
example, the race or sex of the parties. The second aspect of continuing
interest is the process of group decision-making, which until recently
always involved the dynamics of reaching a unanimous verdict.' This
process, taut with the tension between consensus and individual conscience, has been praised as a means of encouraging debate, combating
prejudice, and ensuring a diversity of perspectives.' It has also been
lamented, particularly on the occasions when a jury is hung at the end
of a protracted and expensive trial, or returns a breathtaking damage
* This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant No. BNS 7817438. The authors wish to express their gratitude to Dr. John Thibaut, Susan T. Kurtz, and
Elena Anzalone, who were generous with their guidance and assistance at critical stages of this
project.
** B.A., Yale College; J.D., University of Michigan.
t B.A., University of North Carolina.
I. The democratic character of the American jury has impressed both its warmest defenders, e.g., A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291-97 (1966), and its harshest critics,
e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-25 (1949). See generally R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11-26 (1980).
2.

See Pound, The Law in Books and the Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910).

3.

The use of non-unanimous verdicts by state courts was upheld in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406

U.S. 404 (1972).
4. Eg., Joiner, From the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
145, 146-47 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
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award with what appears to be indecent haste.'
This article will study the interplay of these two aspects of jury decision-making from the perspective of social science. Specifically, we
will review the psychological research in two areas: non-evidentiary
influences on jury judgments, and group problem-solving and decisionmaking. We will consider various ways in which group processes
found to operate in a wide variety of situations may affect the impact of
non-evidentiary influences that have been convincingly demonstrated.
If there is a single thesis whose validity we are investigating, it is a
position articulated forty-five years ago by the experimental psychologist J. F. Dashiell. In a surprisingly contemporary passage he wrote:
Nowhere has the idea that the individual judgment is improved by
conference with others been more insistently held, nor the right to have
the opinion of one replaced by discussion by many more jealously
guarded, than in the trial by jury. These latter days, it is true, have seen
plentiful attacks upon the jury system, many suggestions of supplanting
it with single trained judges or commissions of fact-finders; but the tenacity with which the system is upheld is impressive. True, the motives
operating are mixed: the very humanness of the twelve good men and
true offers a better target for wily and dramatic appeals, and there may
be a natural distrust by the man of simple habits of the learned-judge
class, and he may prefer a common jury to serve as an emotional balance-wheel amid the machinery of legalisms. But surely the central
thread of the arguments for juries is that twelve heads are better than
one. In these days, when the system has been under fire, it is appropriate that experimentalists have tried their hand at unraveling some of
the complications. 6
The better part of this article will be spent unraveling some of the
complications, although we will doubtless raise a few along the way.
We will consider, from several perspectives, the question of whether
twelve heads are better than one at resisting, or at least selectively responding to, the variety of extra-legal influences to which a trial factfinder is subjected. First, we will assess what has actually been concluded about extra-legal influences in order to ascertain if lay factfinders are really as susceptible as their critics suppose. Second, we will
attempt to outline the various ways in which extra-legal factors can
influence the decision-making process, and cite evidence for the operation of these forms of influence in jury decision-making. Third, we will
discuss some of the major findings about group processes which may
affect the reception of extra-legal influences, in particular the group polarization effect. Fourth, we will review a theory of information inte5. For example, recall the critical reaction to the large award in the "Pinto" case. See note
229 supra.
6. Dashiell, Experimental Studies of the Influence ofSocial Situationson the Behavior ofIndividual Human Adults, in HANDBOOK SOC. PSYCH. 1097, 1133 (C. Murchison ed. 1935).
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gration containing a specific hypothesis about the effect of group
deliberation on extra-legal influences. In the fifth section we will discuss several experimental studies that cast doubt on this hypothesis.
Finally, we will present an experiment of our own that explores several
of the issues raised in the preceding discussion, and will propose a
course for future research.
Our point of departure, to which we will continually return, is the
magisterial work of Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American
Jury.' This comprehensive study, initiated by the Chicago Jury Project
in the mid-fifties, might have been expected to confirm the misgivings
that were then prevalent concerning the institution: that the typical
jury lacked the discipline and understanding to render fair decisions in
most cases.' This dim view of jury capacity, a tenet of the then fashionable legal realism, had never received more than anecdotal confirmation.9 Kalven and Zeisel studied jury performance by reviewing 3,576
state and federal criminal trials. They compared the jury verdicts
reached in those trials with the "verdicts" solicited from the presiding
judges. ' Most of The American Jury is a richly detailed analysis of the
evidentiary, equitable, and prejudicial factors that account for the more
than 1,200 cases of total or partial disagreement their survey revealed.
Their results were a striking vindication of jury competence. Kalven
and Zeisel found that jury verdicts were remarkably sensitive to the
strength of the evidence as rated by the trial judges." In the large majority of cases in which judge and jury disagreed, the disagreement
rested on evidentiary issues about which reasonable men could differ,' 2
equitable concerns which the jury shared with legal critics and legislators,' 3 or a combination of evidentiary and equitable issues.' 4 This was
hardly the legal realist's picture
of an undisciplined rabble settling
15
cases by prejudice and caprice.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
8. J. Frank's influential case against jury decision-making is notably long on impressions
and short on research. See J. FRANK, supra note 1.
9. R. SIMON, supra note 1, at 15-16.
10. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 10. The judges surveyed were asked to report
on the reasons for disagreement. Their comments became the basis of the researchers' analysis of
the sources ofjudge-jury divergence. Id. at 92-97. Whenever possible, the validity of the observations from the bench was checked by matching otherwise similar cases that differed in the presence or absence of the cited factor. A significant difference in judge-jury disagreements between
matched cases would tend to confirm the influence of the cited factor. This second method of
analysis is called cross-tabulation. See id. at 88-91, 97-103 for a discussion of this method.
11. Id. at 149-62.
12. Id.at 115-16, 166-90.
13. Id.at 115-16, 219 passim.
14. Id. at 115-16.
15. As Kalven & Zeisel remark, "The realist emphasis seemed often to lend itself to a kind of
inside dopester jurisprudence in which the real reason for decision would be very different from
the surface reasons, and probably rather nasty." The authors offer a contrary view: "For the
7.
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Curiously, Kalven and Zeisel did not feel that group decision-making made an important contribution to the disagreements they discovered between judges and juries. In a frequently quoted passage, they
relate what they call their "radical hunch" about the limited role of
group influences: "The deliberation process might well be likened to
what the developer does for an exposed film: it brings out the picture,
but the outcome is predetermined. ' ' "6 Before offering a dissent to this
view, let us turn to the main body of Kalven and Zeisel's findings,
which concerns the incidence and the causes of disagreement between
juries and judges.
I.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON EXTRA-LEGAL INFLUENCES ON JUROR
DECISION-MAKING

In their analysis of the sources of judge-jury disagreement, Kalven
and Zeisel came to several conclusions heartening to defenders of jury
competence. First, the incidence of disagreement was not very high.
Differences were found in only thirty-four percent of the cases. Only
nineteen percent of the cases involved total disagreement; that is, one
fact-finder acquitting while the other convicted. The remaining fifteen
17
percent involved hung juries, and differences on charge and penalty.
Second, the majority of the reasons found for disagreement (fifty-four
percent) involved close issues of evidence, 8 such as the credibility of
first-time defendants' 9 and the proper threshhold for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 0 Twenty-nine percent of the reasons for disagreement had to do with what Kalven and Zeisel called "sentiments about
the law" 2 -- equitable concerns such as the fault of the victim, 22 the
disproportion of the punishment, 3 or selective enforcement of the
law.2 4 Only eleven percent of the reasons for disagreement concerned
"sentiments about the defendant" 2 -the prejudicial factors of age, status, and beauty that the legal realists would have expected to be predominant. For example, attractive defendants, where present, were
found to cause disagreement in only twenty percent of the cases. 6
largest part the hidden reasons of the jury are reasons which can stand public scrutiny; not infrequently, the jury's rule turns out to be the law in another jurisdiction." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
supra note 7, at 497.
16. Id. at 489.
17. Id. at 62.
18. Id. at 115.
19. Id. at 178-81.
20. Id. at 182-90.
21. Id. at 107-08.
22. Id. at 242-57.
23. Id. at 306-12.
24. Id. at 313-17.
25. Id at 107, 115.
26. Id. at 217.
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Third, these two types of extra-legal influences-sentiments about the
case and the defendant-were rarely the sole reason found for disagreement. Seventy-eight percent of the time that case sentiments were
involved in the disagreement, they were accompanied by other reasons,
while other factors appeared with defendant sentiments a full ninetytwo percent of the time.2 7 These findings led Kalven and Zeisel to an
important conclusion about the role of prejudicial influences:
Sentiments about the individual defendant are seldom powerful
enough to cause disagreement by themselves; rather, they gain their effectiveness only in partnership with some other factor in the case. The
implication again is that for the defendant to be poor and crippled or
rarely a sufficient stimulus for the jury
beautiful and blonde is by itself
28
to disagree with the judge.
When they categorized all disagreements into matters of fact---evidentiary issues, and matters of value-under which they included all
other reasons for disagreement, Kalven and Zeisel found that thirtyfour percent of the differences involved facts alone, forty-five percent
facts and values, and twenty-one percent values alone. 29 For the plurality of cases involving facts and values, the authors suggest a generalization of the account given for the role of defendant sentiments, which
they call the "liberation hypothesis":
The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond
to sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence ...
We know. . . that the jury does not often consciously and explicitly
yield to sentiment in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to sentiment
in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The jury,
therefore, is able to conduct30 its revolt from the law within the etiquette
of resolving issues of facts.
We will treat the judge-jury disagreements found to occur with some
regularity as areas of proven extra-legal influence. This implies no
judgment about which side should be favored in the case of conflict:
that will depend on the legitimacy of the extra-legal factors to which
the jurors appear to be subject. As Kalven and Zeisel remark,
"[D]epending on how one looks at it, the jury can be said to do equity,
to legislate interstitially, to implement its own norms, or to exhibit
bias."' 3 ' Although most of the disagreements found by the Chicago researchers involve evidentiary issues, and hence are not strictly extralegal,32 these issues rarely present simple differences in judgments of
credibility and likelihood. As Kalven and Zeisel point out, they will
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

113.
114.
116.
165.
494.
116.
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often reflect the concealed influence of sentiments above the law and
the defendant.3 3 And even when the evidentiary disputes are "pure" in
Kalven and Zeisel's terms,3 4 they may not arise from simple differences
in probability assessment. Disagreement on the proper threshhold for
decision, or on the appropriate level of skepticism with which to receive
the testimony of certain types of witnesses (for example), reflect differences in values rather than inferential strategies. For this reason, we
find it helpful to include jury disagreements in these areas under the
rubric of extra-legal influence.
The American Jury presented a picture of conscientious and competent jurors, sometimes influenced by equitable concerns in resolving
close cases, less often by personal prejudice. In contrast, the view of the
juror that would have emerged from a review of the experimental literature five or six years ago would have served to confirm the old courtroom adage quoted approvingly by Judge Frank: "Mr. Prejudice and
Miss Sympathy are the names of witnesses whose testimony is never
recorded, but must nevertheless be reckoned with in trials by jury."'"
The simulated jurors studied by social psychologists displayed a susceptibility to extra-legal factors that would not have disappointed a
confirmed legal realist.3 6 The physical attractiveness, 37 moral character, 38 and sex of the parties;3 9 the extent of the victim's and defendant's
injuries;" adverse pretrial publicity;4 ' and the jurors' own authoritarian leanings" were shown to make a significant difference in trial outcome. The influential factors ranged from legally and morally
irrelevant matters (like the defendant's physical attractiveness),4 3
33. Id. 165, 495.
34. Id. 166-67.
35.

J. FRANK, supra note 1, at 122.

36. Many of these findings are cited in a recent diatribe against the jury system. A. STRICK,
INJUSTICE FOR ALL 167-97 (1977). For a more dispassionate review of the state of the research
five years ago, see Stephan, Selective Characteristicsof Jurors and Litigants. Their Influences on
Juries' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 97 (R. Simon ed.
1975).
37. Eg., Kulka & Kessler, Is Justice Really Blind? The Influence of Litigant PhysicalAttractiveness on JuridicalJudgment, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 366 (1978).

38. E.g., Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Characterof the Criminaland His Victim on
the Decisions of Simuated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 141 (1969).

39. E.g., Stephan, Sex Prejudicein Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCH. 305 (1974).
40. E.g., Austin, Walster, & Utne, Equity and the Law.- The Effect of a Harmdoer's"Suffering
in the Act" on Liking andAssignedPunishment, 9 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 163 (L.

Berkowitz & E. Walster eds. 1976).
41. E.g., Sue, Smith, & Gilbert, Biasing Effects of PretrialPublicity on JudicialDecisions, 2 J.
CRIM.JUST. 163 (1974).

42. E.g., Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Jurors'Attitudesand Authoritarianismon JudicialDecisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 123 (1973).

43. Eg., Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal
Attraction, and Severity of Recommended Punishmentin a SimulatedJury Task, 8 J. PERSONALITY
RESEARCH 45 (1974).
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through issues bearing on the equities of the case but not relevant to the
legal issue (such as the harm already suffered by the defendant)," to
highly probative evidence (like illegal wiretaps, excluded solely for policy reasons). 5 The susceptibility of the jury did not seem to depend on
even the broader relevance of the manipulated factors.
The reasons for this impression of wholesale susceptibility are not
hard to discover. Few of these early studies were designed as simulations of actual jury behavior. Rather, they used mock trials as a convenient setting to test general theories of social influence. In accordance
with a well-established research tradition in social psychology, these
studies were designed to draw out the effect of social forces, not to
gauge their impact in actual settings. 6 This is a perfectly legitimate
strategy for theoretical research, but not for trial simulation. The question for applied research is not whether various biasing factors may
distort judgment-that may be conceded-but whether they will do so
in the context of a procedure which attempts to limit and counteract
their influence. A simulation fails to address that question if it ignores
the restrictions, safeguards, and "noise" found in an actual trial setting.
To some extent, then, the objectives of theoretical and applied research
work at cross purposes.4 7
The tension between research objectives may be seen in Landy and
Aronson's influential study, "The Influence of the Character of the
Criminal & His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors."4 8 The
authors set out to display the effect of character evidence by making
one defendant as appealing as possible, the other as unsavory, in an
otherwise identical case. Subjects in the "unattractive" condition read
the following description of the defendant:
[Defendant is] a notorious gangster and syndicate boss who had been
vying for power in the syndicate controlling the state's underworld activities. He was best known for his alleged responsibility in the Riverview massacre of five men. At the time of the incident, Lowe was
carrying a loaded 32-caliber pistol which was found on his body. He
had been out of jail on bond, awaiting trial on a double indictment of
mail fraud and income tax evasion.4 9

This character sketch takes up over a third of the trial summary. Sub44. Austin, Walster, & Utne, supra note 40.
45. Eg., Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors.- A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 345 (1973).

46. A point similar to that developed in this paragraph is made by D. Colasanto & J. Sanders, Methodological Issues in Simulated Jury Research 4 (unpublished revision of a paper delivered at 1978 meetings of Law & Soc'y Assn.).
47. For a discussion of a related problem, the differing methodological objectives in research
on legal theory and practice, see Lind & Walker, Theory Testing, Theory Development, and Laboratory Research on Legal Issues, 3 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1979).

48. Landy & Aronson, supra note 38.
49. Id. at 147-48.
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jects reading this impressive defamation are then asked to give their
personaljudgment on the amount of punishment the defendant should
receive.5 ° It is hard to imagine how such evidence could have failed to
make a difference, and correspondingly hard to see the theoretical, let
alone practical, significance of the finding that it did influence judgments.
Landy and Aronson's experiment nicely illustrates the now familiar
litany of complaints about the validity of trial simulations in social psychology. 5 ' Not only is the extra-legal factor often the most salient feature of the stimulus material (an acceptable emphasis in a theoretical
study), but it is presented in a manner that underlines its importance
and encourages its uncritical reception. The manipulation is generally
embedded in a brief printed summary, supposed to be the functional
equivalent of a trial.5 2 Its very prominence would suggest to the subject
that it was properly to be taken into account, an impression that is
rarely contradicted by instructions on the proper use of the evidence.
Further, the subjects in many of these experiments were only nominally
jurors. Apart from being labelled as such, they were subject to none of
the constraints or pressures that would encourage objectivity and impartiality in a real trial: they received no voir dire, no oath, no restrictive instructions; they did not deliberate as a group or reach a group
decision; and there were, of course, no real consequences.5 3 Finally,
they were often asked to decide on punishment, not guilt, a decision for
50. Id. at 148.
51. The most important critique of jury simulations in social psychology is probably D. Colasanto & J. Sanders' working paper, supra note 46. Not only were Sanders and Colasanto among
the first to make some of the criticisms noted below, but they illustrated their critique with an
impressive experiment. Adapting a real case, they demonstrated that the use of students rather
than veteran jurors, and the failure to employ deliberation--two of the most common shortcomings of jury simulations-resulted in greatly reduced conformity to the legally correct model for
decision-making. We will make frequent reference to this paper, largely in footnotes, because the
complexity of Colasanto and Sanders' experiment makes it difficult to integrate into our textual
discussion.
Another major critique of jury studies is Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo, The Logic of
Simulation in Jury Research, I CRIM. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 224 (1974). The authors complained

about the lack of structural verisimilitude in most simulations; that is, realism in the stimulus
material presented and the subjects to whom it was presented. Like Sanders and Colasanto, they
confirmed their misgivings experimentally, showing that differences in the medium of presentation, from printed summary to audio-visual enactment, made a significant difference in the verdicts reached in a homicide case. Recently, an entire issue of Law & Human Behavior has been
devoted to "Simulation Research and the Law." See 3 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1979). It contains two very harsh appraisals ofjury simulation research: Weiten & Diamond, A CriticalReview
ofthe Jury Simulation Paradigm, id. at 71-93; Vidmar, The Other Issues in Jury Simulation Research, id. at 95-106; and a more sympathetic piece, Bray & Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in
the Study ofJury Behavior, id. at 107-19, that may signal the emergence of a revisionist trend.
52. See D. Colasanto & J. Sanders, supra note 46, at 3-4, 28-29 nn.4-5.
53. Id. at 5-6, 29-30 nn.7-8. On the lack of real consequences, obviously the least tractable
problem in simulation research, see Bray & Kerr, supra note 51, at 113-14.
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which many of the manipulated factors were arguably relevant.
In experiments that have presented more realistic case material, or
encouraged more serious role involvement on the part of subject-jurors,
the influence of extra-legal factors has not been so uniform. At least
two types of studies suggest that the effect of the manipulated informato the case and
tion about the defendant varies with its actual relevance
55
the opportunity to deliberate about the evidence.

In the first group of cases, juror responses appear to be affected more
by the probative than by the prejudicial value of the extra-legal factors
manipulated. Sealy and Cornish,56 using audio-taped trials and deliberating juries, found that the introduction of the defendant's prior record (without restrictive instructions) increased the frequency of
conviction. However, the increase was much greater when the record
disclosed crimes similar to the one presently charged, which would obviously be more probative than unrelated crimes.57 This was true even
when the similar offense (theft) was likely to be far less damaging to the
overall evaluation of the defendant than the dissimilar one (child-molesting).58 Shaffer, Case, and Brannen5 9 found that mock jurors' convictions increased significantly when the defendant claimed a fifth
amendment freedom from self-incrimination regarding questions about
the offense charged, but not about unrelated past offenses. They found
a significant difference in the conviction rates when case-relevant and
case-irrelevant evidence was withheld, even though there was no significant difference in the adverse effect of the two types of withholding on
jurors' assessments of the defendant's character. 60 Thus, as with Cornish and Sealy, general character judgments did not affect the conviction rate independently of the strength of the evidence. Finally, in the
carefully staged, painstakingly realistic simulations headed by Miller, 6 1
jurors proved consistently resistant to a variety of mundane extra-legal
factors-such as prior convictions for minor, unrelated offenses-to
which real jurors are most likely to be exposed.
54. See D. Colasanto & J. Sanders, supra note 46, at 5.
55. In their previously cited demonstration, D. Colasanto & J. Sanders found an interesting
interaction of case-relevance and type of subject. For a single item of evidence, ex-jurors were
influenced by its probative value for the case, students by the pro-defendant sympathies it engendered. Id.
56. L.S.E. Jury Project, Juriesand the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208 (1973) (P.
Scaly & W. Cornish directors).
57. 1d. at 212-19.
58. Id.
59. Shaffer, Case, & Brannen, Effect of Withheld Evidence on Juridic Decisions. Amount of
Evidence Withheld and It. Relevance to the Case, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH SOC. PSYCH. 2

(1979).
60. Id. at 10-13.
61. See Miller, The Effect of Videotaped Trial Materials on Juror Response, in PSYCHOLOGY
AND THE LAW 185, 195-99 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth, & N. Vidmar eds. 1976).
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In a second group of experiments, a prejudicial factor with very low
relevance was found to affect juror verdicts before, but not after deliberation. Izzett and Leginski6 2 found that the biasing effect of defendant
attractiveness disappeared after deliberation. Kaplan and L. Miller6 3
found that individual jurors were more certain of the defendant's guilt
when his attorney or even the judge behaved obnoxiously during the
trial. After deliberation, however, this effect of courtroom conduct disappeared. In what appears to be a contradictory result, Hans and
Doob6 4 found that revelation of a single previous conviction (apparently for a similar offense), accompanied by an instruction that it was
to be used only in assessing credibility, had no effect on individual jurors, but did influence the decisions of deliberating groups. The effect
on the groups was quite dramatic: "Forty percent of the juries that
heard of the accused man's criminal record arrived at guilty verdicts,
whereas none of the juries that heard nothing about the criminal record
arrived at this verdict."6 5
We will review this apparent contradiction when we discuss the
group polarization effect; for now, what is of interest is the manner in
which the prior crime evidence was used by Hans and Doob's deliberating juries. It was not adduced to show the defendant's propensity to
commit crimes in direct violation of the judge's instruction. As Kalven
and Zeisel noted, jurors seem reluctant to bring up improper considerations in the teeth of the law.66 Rather, as Doob describes it, the juries'
discussion provides a good illustration of how extra-legal influences
can affect the decision "within the etiquette" of evaluating the admissible evidence:
The initial statements that were made when the jury began to deliberate were much more likely in the record condition to be unfavorable
to the accused. As the discussion progressed, it was clear that the information about the previous criminal conviction was affecting the discussion in other subtle ways. Thus, the record groups were more likely to
discuss matters that hurt the defendant's case; they were more likely to
think that the various pieces of evidence that the prosecution mentioned were strong, and so forth. All in all, the nature of the delibera67
tions was quite different as a result of this one piece of evidence.
62. Izzett & Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of Defendant Characteristicsin a
Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. Soc. PSYCH. 271 (1974).
63. Kaplan & L. Miller, Reducing the Effect ofJurorBias, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1443 (1978).
64. Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberationsof Simulated
Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1976).
65. Doob, Evidence, Procedure,and PsychologicalResearch, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW
135, 142 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth, & N. Vidmar eds. 1976).
66. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 165.
67. Doob, supra note 65, at 142.
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How

EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE JUROR
DECISIONS

This last group of experiments presents a picture of the jury reasonably close to Kalven and Zeisel's: a conscientious group generally resisting prejudicial or other excluded considerations, more likely to be
swayed when those considerations are relevant to the case and can insinuate themselves into a discussion of the admissible evidence. The
above passage from Doob suggests various ways in which excluded information can affect deliberation without being explicitly considered.
We will expand this list and discuss in greater detail some of the ways
in which inadmissible evidence can influence the outcome of a case.
Wherever possible, we will cite experiments in which excluded information has been shown or suggested to operate in this way. We will
present these forms of influence roughly in ascending order of subtlety,
starting with the most blatant, and later argue that several accounts of
group deliberation fail to consider the more oblique ways in which bias
and predisposition may affect the decision process.
A.

The extra-legalfactormay be explicitly considered and treatedas
havingprobative value just as any other item of evidence

There is no doubt that decision-makers will sometimes disregard altogether restrictive instructions, and will reach their verdict "in the
teeth of the law." The more relevant the excluded evidence, the more
tempting and defensible it may seem to disregard such restriction.
There is anecdotal and even some experimental evidence that such blatant disregard of restrictive instructions is not common.6 8 It may be
that most disregard is inadvertent, the result of a failure to understand
or to remember restrictive instructions.
B.

The extra-legalfactor may affect the standardofproof

As Thomas and Hogue, 69 Kerr, 70 and others have pointed out, the
legal decision-maker must resolve two issues: the probability that a
party is correct, and the threshhold probability for finding in his favor.
In civil cases, where the standard of proof is "a [mere] preponderance
of the evidence," these separate tasks may be hard to distinguish. In
criminal cases, however, the establishment of the threshhold for reasonable doubt should present itself as a distinct task from the evaluation of
the evidence.
68. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 32 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959).
69. Thomas & Hogue, Apparent Weight ofEvidence, Decision Criteria,and Confidence Ratings
in JurorDecision Making, 83 PSYCH. REv. 442 (1976).

70. Kerr, Severity of PrescribedPenalty and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 1431 (1978).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980

11

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1980], Art. 5

EXTRA -LEGAL INFLUENCES

While these issues may not always be distinguished by a deliberating
jury, the law treats them very differently. It gives the jury almost unbridled freedom in weighing the evidence, but attempts to impose a
decision threshold by setting a standard of proof. It is unlikely, however, that the law achieves the desired uniformity with the opaque instructions that jurors actually receive. For example, several studies
have shown that jurors assign widely variant probabilities to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.7
Such variability makes it likely that the standard of proof will be
subject to extra-legal influence. Kerr found that juries which estimated
the probabilities of guilt no differently for an attractive and an unattractive defendant nonetheless convicted the latter more often. 2 This
strongly suggests a lower standard of proof for the unattractive defendant. Similarly, but less disturbingly, he found that increasing the penalty for a given offense reduced the frequency of conviction but not the
rated probability of guilt.73 It seems likely that strong equitable or
prejudicial concerns that have little bearing on the probabilities of the
case will affect the outcome by implicitly changing the standard of
proof. This change may not be the result of overt discussion, but rather
of a difference in the consistency with which one side receives the benefit of the doubt or has its evidence more severely scrutinized, and thus
may resemble one of the processes described below.
C.

The extra-legalfactor may "slide into" a legitimate consideration
thatprovides the basis orpretextfor its consideration

Discussing cases in which the unattractiveness of the defendant may
have caused the jury to be more rigorous than the judge, Kalven and
Zeisel note: "In the cases examined it is apparent that there is always a
considerable link, in the eyes of the jury, between the unattractiveness
of the defendant and his credibility."7 4 It is hard to say if this exaggerated tendency is simply an error of judgment, or whether it is a case of
judgment bending to accommodate prejudice. This form of influence
has been studied in the experimental literature: Dion has claimed that
the effect of physical appearance is generally mediated by credibility
judgments, with more attractive parties perceived as more trustworthy.7 5 Kulka and Kessler, however, have argued that the effect ob71. In particular, Simon, "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"-An Experimental Attempt at Quantification, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ScL 203 (1970); Simon & Mahan, Quantfying Burdens of
Proof A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 L. & Soc'Y REV. 319 (1971).
72. Kerr, Beautful and Blameless- Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibilityon Mock
Jurors' Verdicts, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 479 (1978).
73. Kerr, supra note 70.
74. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 385.
75. Dion, Physical Attractiveness and Evaluation of Children's Transgressions, 24 J. PERSON-
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served by Dion usually occurs when subjects are afforded merely a
momentary glimpse of the target individual.7 6 A brief exposure may
encourage a "stereotypic" inference from attractiveness to honesty that
will vanish with extended contact. There are other ways in which this
passage from forbidden to legitimate considerations may take place.
Kulka and Kessler claim that unattractive victims are perceived as having suffered less serious injuries, receiving less favorable verdicts
through an insidious devaluation of their worth.7 7 In our own experiment, we present jurors with a piece of evidence which both arouses
pity and gives information about objective injury, and note the easy
transition from one to the other.78
D.

By causing the decision-maker tofavor one side, the extra-legal
factor may motivate him to emphasize the evidence favoring
that side

Doob found that the primary effect of the defendant's record on deliberation was to encourage the selective marshalling of pro-prosecution evidence.79 The process is similar to that described in section C
above, except that it does not require a special affinity between the excluded and admissible evidence. Further, the process described in that
section can affect the evaluation of single items of evidence without
requiring that the excluded information push the juror toward a particular outcome. Here, it is suggested that the excluded information
causes the decision-maker to favor one side of the case, encouraging
him to muster evidence in its support. The stronger the effect of the
extra-legal factors in disposing the juror toward one side of the case,
the more this process tends to resemble the rationalization of a decision
already made.
E.

The extra-legalfactormay so dispose thefact-finder toward one
side of the case that it makes the evidencefor that side
appear much stronger
This process may be similar to that described in section D, and is

ALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 207 (1972). See Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, What is Goodis Beautiful,24 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 285 (1972).

76. Kulka & Kessler, supra note 37, at 369.
77. Id. at 374-75.
78. As noted above, supra note 55, Sanders and Colasanto discovered that a single piece of
information could be utilized more or less appropriately by different fact-finders. In the case they
presented, knowledge that the victim of a theft was the state, rather than an individual, could have
been used either to make credible the defendant's belief that the goods were abandoned, or to
make the loss appear less significant. The former, but not the latter, would be a legally permitted
use of the evidence.
79. Doob, supra note 65, at 142.
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also reported by Doob to be operating in his juries.8" Here, in contrast
to section D, the evidence favoring one side is not necessarily given
more emphasis, but rather is perceived to favor that side more strongly.
To suggest a distinction we will develop later, extra-legal factors may
distort either the weight or the probative value of the evidence. Ostrom, Werner, and Saks found that both the comparative importance
and the perceived probative value of items of evidence varied with the
positions of the jurors concerning conviction and punishment.8'
The exaggeration of the probative value of the evidence may occur in
one of two ways. It may be a motivated distortion: a way of reconciling a commitment not to use that information with the belief that the
excluded information really settles the issue. This process is familiar to
social psychologists as one of the ways in which the dissonance created
by conflicting commitments and beliefs may be resolved. While we
have found no experiments which illustrate its operation in a trial context, there are dramatic illustrations of this effect in other settings.82
A second way in which excluded information may inflate the probative value of admitted evidence is simply by making it appear more
informative or diagnostic. Because the excluded factors make a particular outcome appear more likely, the evidence favoring that outcome
appears to have greater inferential value. B. Fischhoff called this the
"hindsight effect," 83 which he tested in an ingenious series of experiments.8 4 In one of these, 85 subjects were asked to estimate the
probability of a given outcome for a historical event with which they
were previously unacquainted. They were presented with facts that favored both possibilities. One group of subjects was told what the actual
outcome had been, then told to ignore this knowledge in giving their
probability estimate. Not surprisingly, these subjects estimated the
probability of the actual outcome to be much higher. They also found
the evidence favoring that outcome to be more probative.
Clearly, these subjects were not motivated to distort the probabilities:
in this guessing game they had no need to rationalize their preference
for the actual outcome. Rather, it appears that subjects were simply
not capable of disregarding what they had been told about the actual
80. Id.
81. Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, An Integration TheoryAnalysis of Jurors' Presumptionsof Guilt
or Innocence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 436 (1978).

82. E.g., Knox & Inkster, Postdecision Dissonance at Post Time, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 319 (1968).

83. Fischhoff, Hindsight-Foresight. The Effect o/Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH: HUMAN PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
84. Id.; Fischhoff & Beyth, "1 Knew It Would Happen" Remembered Probabilitiesof OnceFuture Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUMAN PERFORMANCE 1 (1975).
85. Fischhoff, supra note 83.
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outcome: it had indelibly altered the way they perceived the strength
of the evidence favoring that outcome.
This completes our outline of the forms of extra-legal influence. The
list is by no means exhaustive; it is merely intended to highlight several
proven forms of "liberation" from evidentiary constraints. Group decision-making may affect this process of liberation in a variety of ways.
It may suppress it, either by stifling discussion of excluded information,
or by exposing and discrediting extra-legal influences that would work
silently on individual judgment. Alternatively, the group may heighten
the impact of extra-legal factors by facilitating either the wholesale disregard of restrictive instructions or their circumvention. Until we know
something about the way in which groups like juries operate, we cannot
even speculate about which of these alternatives is more likely.
III.

GROUP PROCESSES RELEVANT TO JURY DELIBERATION

We now return to what Kalven and Zeisel call their "radical hunch"
about the function of group deliberation-that "it does not so much
decide the case as bring about the consensus, the outcome of which has
already been made highly likely by the distribution of first ballot
votes. '"86 They do not claim that group processes are unimportant for
juries, but that they have little effect on the verdict finally reached, and
thus do not need to be addressed in a study of judge-jury outcome differences. But even this modest claim is called into question by the very
data cited in its support.
Kalven and Zeisel had found in an earlier study that over ninety
percent of all verdicts are in the direction of the first ballot majority.87
The significance of this measure of comparison has been questioned by
Lamberth. 8 He points out that jurors were asked about their first ballots after the verdict, and were thus less likely to have been willing or
able to recall initial preferences at odds with the final decision. Further, the first ballot will often be taken after some deliberation, and
hence may already reflect its influence.
But even if Lamberth's criticisms are unfounded, there are at least
two reasons why the correspondence between initial majority and final
verdict would not minimize the role of group deliberation in producing
judge-jury differences. First, the nine percent of all cases in which initial pro-acquittal majorities convict or are hung, and more important,
the fourteen percent of all cases where pro-conviction majorities are
hung or acquit, may represent a disproportionate number of those cases
in which judge and jury disagree. If so, these maverick juries would
86. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 489.
87. Id. at 487.
88. J. LAMBERTH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 468-71 (1980).
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merit careful study as a major source of outcome divergence. But a
disproportion in the other direction would be equally significant, because it would suggest that the success of the initial majority tends to
amplify judge-jury disagreement. The data on initial majorities came
from a study in which judge-jury differences were not reported; hence,
Kalven and Zeisel provide no way of investigating these possibilities.
Second, Kalven and Zeisel present fully analyzed data only on criminal trials, in almost all of which the jury had only a yes/no decision to
reach on each charge.8 9 The effects of group deliberation may be more
pronounced in a civil trial where juries have a continuous choice as
well as a dichotomous one-the amount of damages to award if they
find for the plaintiff. Kalven and Zeisel note that in a sample of these
cases, the jury award averaged twenty percent more than the judge's in
those cases where both found liability,9 ° and this may well reflect an
effect of group deliberation.
The point we wish to make here is simple: Kalven and Zeisel's data
do not give us any reason to ignore the role of group processes in determining the effect of extra-legal factors. These factors have been shown
to influence juror decisions in a variety of situations, and there is no
reason why group processes should not mediate their effect. As will be
discussed, one of the major group effects that psychologists have discovered is the heightening, or polarization, of the judgment made by an
initial majority. This effect has been rather complacently taken to explain Kalven and Zeisel's finding on verdicts and first ballots.9 ' We
intend to argue that the application of the group polarization process to
jury decisions is much more complicated than usually assumed, and to
suggest how this process can lead to the reversal of an initial majority
in some fairly common judgment situations.
Having stated our case for the potential significance of group
processes for judge-jury disagreements, let us turn to the psychological
research in the area. We will briefly present the psychological findings
that bear on two aspects of jury decision-making: group problem-solving, and group-mediated attitude change. The issues a jury must resolve in reaching a verdict range from those on which there is an
objectively correct answer to those that are ultimately matters of opinion or value.9 2 There has been considerable psychological research on
89. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 62, 301 n.1.
90. Id. at 64 n.13.
91. E.g., Myers & Lamm, The Group PolarizationPhenomenon, 83 PSYCH. BULL. 602, 606
(1976).
92. Contrast a case in which the identity of the perpetrator is the sole question to one in
which the issue is whether an undisputed course of conduct reveals a lack of due care. The first is
a "simple matter of fact"; the second involves a standard of conduct which the jurors, as representatives of the community, help to establish. Damaska makes a related distinction between "factual
findings" and "legal decisions." Damaska, Presentationof Evidence andFacsfndingPrecision, 123
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the role of groups in resolving both kinds of issues.
A.

Research on Group Problem-Solving

Studies of group problem-solving have generally focused on
problems for which there is a correct answer, known to the experimenter, and on other performances for which there are objective criteria of success.9 3 The applicability of this research to jury behavior is
obviously limited by the difficulty of having to specify the correct verdict in advance. Still, this does not make objective assessment of jury
performance impossible. Even if the ultimate truth of the matter in a
legal conflict may not be known, there are objective standards by which
to judge jury performance. Kalven and Zeisel adopted the judge's decision as the "legally correct" outcome by which the conformity of the
jury to "professional" standards could be assessed.94 Further, the jury
may have sub-tasks on which there is clearly a correct answer, or at
least demonstrably wrong answers. The recall of the evidence actually
presented at trial is one such objectively assessable task. A transcript of
a jury deliberation would undoubtedly reveal at least a handful of
oversights, exaggerations, and logical errors by at least some of the participants. Thus, the jury will confront certain problems that have objectively correct solutions.
Having insisted that the research on group problem solving is applicable to jury decision-making, we must now admit that it may not be
very useful. Much of the research in this area has studied group facilitation or interference across a wide range of problems, without analyzing the differential effect of groups on different kinds of tasks. This
shortcoming is complemented by a deficiency in the analysis of legal
decisionmaking: the type of cognitive task performed by trial
factfinders is not very well understood. Only in the past decade has the
inferential process involving the integration of probablistic evidence
been analyzed by mathematical psychologists,9 5 and the affinities of
this process with the tasks commonly employed in the group problemsolving literature have yet to be explored. Nevertheless, I. Steiner has
recently developed a common-sense taxonomy of tasks, and demonU. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1086-87 (1975). Of course, most cases involve issues of fact and value in
complex relation, and as we intend to argue, even simple fact-determination is laden with value
judgments. This point is also made in our discussion of the value differences that may be inherent
in even "pure" evidentiary disagreements. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
93. See generally GROUP PROCESSES 1-113 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978).
94. The use of the judge's hypothetical decision as a standard for comparison is defended by
Kalven and Zeisel. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 51-54.
95. See, e.g., Schum, The Weighting of Testimony in JudicialProceedingsfromSources Having
Reduced Credibility, 17 HUMAN FACTORS 172 (1975).
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strated the varying effect of groups on different task areas.96 His distinctions will at least suggest some ways in which jury deliberation may
improve on or detract from individual performance. Steiner classified
tasks by the relationship of individual performance to group performance. Cumulative tasks are those where the responses of the group
members are simply pooled; that is, where the group that has the largest total "wins."9 7 Naturally, the larger the group, the better it does,
with some diminishing returns due to coordination problems, diffused
responsibility, and reduced motivation. Tug-of-war is the obvious and
most frequently cited example of this kind of task. Compartmentalized
tasks are assignments that can be divided into a number of sub-tasks,
with members assigned to the area for which they are most qualified.9 8
Again, large groups do better, because they permit finer differentiation
of sub-tasks and make more likely a close match between member
skills and tasks.
Conjunctive tasks are those where every member of a group must
perform correctly to ensure the success of the whole group.99 Here,
groups will be at a disadvantage (and the larger the group, the worse
the disadvantage), because they will perform at the level of their worst,
not their average or best, member. To the extent that juries require a
consensus that can be blocked by the response of one, or a small handful of members, they face the disadvantages of a conjunctive task.
Disjunctive tasks are those where the best response counts as the
group response."° Here, groups are at a decided advantage over individuals, because the more individuals participating the greater the
probability of a correct answer. Occasionally, at least, jury deliberation
can have this character, inasmuch as one juror may enlighten the rest.
Disjunctive tasks can be divided into those where the best individual
response automatically counts for the group, and those where it will do
so only if adopted by the others.' ° ' Obviously, the most enlightened
response of individual jurors will "count for the group" only if the
group adopts it. An interesting question is the extent to which the tasks
faced by the jury are ones where the best or correct response, if given
by one member, will immediately be recognized as such by the others.
Later we intend to discuss the extent to which the elimination of bias
presents jurors with this kind of "Eureka" task. °2
96. Steiner, Task-Performing Groups, in CONTEMPORARY ToPics IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
393 (J. Thibaut, J. Spence, & R. Carson eds. 1976).
97. Id. at 403-04.
98. Id. at 407-09.
99. Id. at 406.
100. Id. at 405.
101. See Shaw, A ComparisonofIndividualsand Small Groups in the RationalSolution of Complex Problems, 44 AM. J. PSYCH. 491 (1932).
102. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
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One area in which a "Eureka" effect might be expected is the simple
recall of the evidence presented: the fallible memories of individual
jurors should be improved by group discussion. A correct recollection
is likely to be recognized as such, because relatively little time will have
elapsed since trial and the jurors will have been exposed to the evidence under the same favorable viewing conditions. In the 1930's, J.F.
Dashiell conducted a series of experiments in which he staged a dramatic event in front of witnesses, had those witnesses "testify" about
the event to a jury, and then compared the completeness and accuracy
of the reports from witnesses, individual jury members, and the unanimous juries. His results were encouraging:
After the jurors had discussed the testimony among themselves, the net
unanimous report was clearly less complete. . . but clearly more accurate than that of any individual witness or individual juror. Apparently, the unanimity requirement affected the results of groupdiscussion by reducing the range of individual suggestions as accepted,
but this operated especially to cut down the erroneous items.'° 3
In a 1969 review of group problem-solving literature, Kelley and
Thibaut cite several other studies confirming that groups did significantly better than the average, and often the best, individuals on recall
tasks." Further, this improvement appears to have been mediated by
a "Eureka" effect. They quote one researcher's observation: "[W]hen
one member suggests a correct segment, other are likely to 'recognize' it
even though they were unable to recall that particular portion of the
story when they were working alone."'' 0 5 These results are helpful to
the accounts of group deliberation discussed later, the assumption being that the jury's discussion will be representative of the evidence
presented at trial. We should note in anticipation, however, that none
of the problem-solving tasks cited here presented group members with
the kind of temptation to distort the evidence that may confront real
jurors.
B.

The Group PolarizationPhenomenon

For most of the brief history of modem social psychology, it was
thought that the primary effects of group decision-making on individual participants were conformity to the majority or prevailing opinion,
and a general inertia and conservativism. " The adherence of individuals to the majority position was suggested in classic experiments by
Sherif and Asch, both of whom showed individuals altering simple
103.
104.
105.
106.

Dashiell, supra note 6, at 1136-37.
Kelly & Thibaut, Group Problem Solving, in 4 HANDBOOK SOC. PSYCH. 1, 65-68 (1969).
Id. at 67.
See, e.g., Bamlund, A Comparative Study of Individual Majority and Group Judgment, 58
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 55 (1959).
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perceptual judgments to accord with those made by other participants.'0 7 These experiments raised a continuing debate over whether
the changed judgments were due more to the social pressure exerted or
to the information yielded by the group, and the related question of
whether the participants displayed mere public conformity or enduring
attitude change.0 8 As we intend to show, these are recurring issues in
the study of group influences. The other quality which was thought to
pervade group decision-making was a cautiousness and resistance to
change exceeding that of the individual members. This aspect of
groups was revealed less by research than by contemporary social commentary, which viewed the Organization Man and the Committee as
bulwarks of inertia. 0 9
It was a pleasant surprise, then, and the kind of unexpected discovery that convinces social scientists of their professional worth, when the
systematic comparison of individual and group preferences revealed
neither simple conformity nor increased conservatism. In the early
1960's, researchers found that individuals, after having discussed the
decision in groups, favored riskiercourses of action in hypothetical situations. "' Originally, this effect was thought to be limited to the exaggeration of a preference for risk. It was labelled "the risky shift," and
initially was thought to result from the diffusion of responsibility in
groups. ' It has since been discovered, however, that many values that
are initially favored by a majority of group members will be more
strongly endorsed after group discussion." 2 A shift toward a more extreme position in groups, then, is not merely confined to a preference
for risk. In a 1976 review, Myers and Lamm cited reports that group
discussion polarized initial positions on political leaders, civil disobedience, pacifism, capital punishment, charitable contributions, faculty
evaluation, demographic estimates, and jury decisions on guilt and
punishment.' 13 In certain choice situations, researchers found a pro107. Asch, Effects of Group Pressures on Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in READT. Newcomb, & E. Hartley eds. 1958); M. SHERIF,

INGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174 (E. Maccoby,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936).

108. These distinctions were raised and addressed experimentally by Deutsch & Gerard, 4
Study of Normative and InformationalSocial Influences Upon Individual Judgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 629 (1955).
109. See, e.g., W. WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
110. The discovery was first made by J. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Involving Risk (1961) (unpublished master's thesis at Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
11. Wallach, Kogan, & Bern, Diffusion of Responsibility and Level of Risk Taking in Groups,
68 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 263 (1964). The experimental "track record" of this account is
reviewed in Dion, Baron, & Miller, Why Do Groups Make Riskier Decisions than Individuals, 5
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 305 (1970).
112. The generalization of the group shift was proposed by Moscovici & Zavalloni, The Group
as a Polarizer of.Attitudes, 12 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 125 (1969).
113. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 604-10.
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nounced conservative, rather than a risky, shift." 4 Although the polarizing of initial positions has not been demonstrated consistently in
the area of risk preference and has failed to appear at all in other settings, ll5 it is clearly a much broader phenomenon than originally believed. Having been shown to affect a variety of value judgments
besides risk, the extremity shift has been more aptly termed "group
polarization." The diffusion-of-responsibility account, tailored to risk,
has lost much of its appeal, opening the way for several broader explanations. 116
The most "economical" account treats the apparent polarization of
initial positions as no more than the result of adopting a social decision
rule." 7 The members of the deliberating group agree, explicitly or implicitly, to go along with the preferences of a majority, two-thirds, or
some other fraction of its members. 1 8 Even without any attitude
change, the adoption of such a rule will often make collective decisions
more extreme than individual ones.' '1 But as Myers and Lamm point
out, this statistical explanation can hardly give a complete account of
the group polarization effect.' 20 Even if correct, it would leave unexplained why individual positions, as well as the group decision, shift
toward the dominant pole after discussion, and remain polarized when
discussion is over. Further, this polarization has occurred even when
members have lacked the opportunity to combine their positions by a
social decision rule. Myers and Lamm cite evidence that the account
fails even as a partial explanation: a review of several studies shows
that the initial distributions which should lead to more extreme group
decisions under the various decision
rules do a poor job of predicting
2
the polarization actually found.' '
The inadequacy of the statistical account allows us to consider two
more familiar and more congenial explanations, encountered first in
the debate over the findings of conformity research. Shifts in individual preference may occur (1) because it is socially desirable to adopt a
more extreme position, or (2) because group discussions generate information favoring a more extreme position. Much recent debate has fo114. See, e.g., Zaleska, Majority Influence on Group Choices Among Bets, 33 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCH. 8 (1976).
115. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 608-10.
116. Id. at 603. See also Moscovici & Zavalloni, supra note 112.
117. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 609.
118. For a more detailed discussion evaluating these and more complex social decision rules,
see Penrod & Hastie, Models of Jury Decisionmaking: A Critical Review, 86 PSYCH. BULL. 462
(1980).
119. Id.
120. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 611-13.
121. Id.at 612-13.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980

21

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1980], Art. 5
EXTRA -LEGAL INFLUENCES

cused on the merits and compatibility of these two approaches. 122
The account of group polarization in terms of social desirability has
at least two variants: one involves values that are strongly but "covertly" held; the other concerns publicly approved values.' 23 In the
former, individuals who have subdued or understated their individual
preferences in conformity with some external norm find that the other
members of the group share the suppressed value, a discovery that releases them from the external constraints.' 24 This "liberation" effect
will be the subject of discussion in our analysis of experiments that
have shown a heightened effect of extra-legal influences following deliberation.
The second variant (sometimes called "the value hypothesis") 25 involves an approved value such as generosity or fairness, which individuals prefer to think they hold at least as strongly as their peers. Group
discussion may reveal to them that they are not manifesting this value
with the comparative strength they had supposed, and thus will cause a
revision of their preference or decision so as to express it more strongly.
It should be noted that this effect, while due to social influence, is not a
simple matter of public conformity. The individual member who revises his position upward does not merely wish to appear more skeptical, militant, or risky; he wants to be more skeptical, militant, or risky.
If he revises his position to achieve that goal, he is unlikely to revert
after discussion has ended.
Another series of explanations focuses on the informational effects of
group interaction. They share the claim that the shift in individual positions occurs because discussion will generate more, or more persuasive, arguments in the dominant direction.' 26 Quite apart from social
influence, initial positions move toward the extreme because the group
presents more and better reasons for that position than the individuals
would provide for themselves. Most proponents of this view concede
that the persuasive edge enjoyed by the dominant value may depend on
social influence in a variety of ways. 27 It has been shown that the
122. See generally Miller, A Questionnairein Search of a Theory, in GROUP PROCESSES 301 (L.
Berkowitz ed. 1978).
123. Id. at 303-04.
124. Id. at 303.
125. Actually, there are several versions of the "admired value" account, differing in the emphasis they place on public appearance or "self presentation." Id at 303-04. A review of the
value hypothesis, perhaps the most complete account of group polarization, may be found in
Dion, Baron, & Miller, supra note 11I.
126. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 616.
127. Id. at 618-19. Myers and Lamm find the evidence for informational influence "compelling," but insist that a complete account must explain the social motivation underlying that influence.
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more extreme members are the most admired,' 28 making the others
more receptive to their arguments. Some research indicates that the
more extreme members may be perceived as more sincere or competent. 129 Myers and Lamm suggest that the members of the group may
tailor their comments to fit the dominant tendency they perceive in order to present themselves favorably. Once made, however, the arguments acquire a force of their own. In presenting and listening to them,
the members of the groups are rationally persuaded to adopt a more
extreme position than they previously held.' 3 0
The integrated approach of Myers and Lamm is probably favored by
most current researchers. 13 1 Experiments have repeatedly shown that
both value comparison and information exchange bring about polarization, and neither has been convincingly shown to be dispensible in
that process. 3 2 In the discussion that follows, we assume that in at
least some settings both types of influences play a role.
A quite different cognitive explanation for polarized attitudes comes
from information integration theory (hereinafter referred to as IIT).
lIT is an attempt to give a general account of how diverse information
bearing on a particular issue is incorporated into a final "verdict."' 3 3 It
treats all matters considered by the decision-maker as having two components: scale value-how informative the item is on the issue in question, and weight-how important, salient, or trustworthy the item is.
Although this distinction is not drawn clearly or consistently, it is useful in approaching evidence combinations. 134 IIT makes an important
128. See, e.g., Jellison & Riskind, .4Social Comparison ofAbilities InterpretationofRisk Taking Behavior, 15 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 375 (1970).

129. See, e.g., Eisinger & Mills, Perception of the Sincerity and Competence ofa Communicator
as a Function of the Extremity of His Position, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 224 (1968), cited in

Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 414.
130. Id. at 418-20.
131. Miller, supra note 122, at 309.
132. Id. at 305-08.
133. See Kaplan & Kemmerick, JurorJudgmentAs InformationIntegration CombiningEvidential and Nonevidential Information, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 493 (1974).

134. At times, the distinction seems to be similar to one made by mathematical psychologists
between the diagnosticityof a piece of information--the extent it is seen by the subject as favoring
one hypothesis over another, and the salience of the information-how prominent or memorable
it is for the subject. See, e.g., Wallsten, Processing Informationfor Decisions, in 2 COGNITIVE
THEORY 87, 90-92 (Castellan, Pisoni, & Potts eds. 1977). Kaplan and his colleagues, however,
treat the credibility of a source as affecting the weight, and not the scale value, of the information.
Kaplan & L. Miller, infra note 136. This appears to be an oversimplification because subjects do
make adjustments in probative value with changes in credibility, although these adjustments are
consistently too small. See Schum, supra note 95. Elsewhere, Myers and Kaplan state that normative social pressure in groups affects the weight of the information, and informational influence
affects its scale value. Myers & Kaplan, Group Induced Polarizationin Simulated Juries, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 66 (1976).

This analysis is puzzling in light of Kaplan's later

claim that deliberation does not affect the scale value of the evidence. See text accompanying
note 145 infra. In the following discussion, we treat weight and scale value as corresponding to
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claim about the way in which information is combined: that the weight
of all the information is averaged, so that the more information there is,
the less the effective weight of any particular item. For this reason, the
effective weight of an item depends on its weight relative to the other
items under 35consideration, and on the number of other items being
considered. 1
It is important to note that this account would predict polarization
toward a particular extreme only when the scale value of the evidence
was closer to that extreme than was the initial disposition. If, instead,
the initial disposition favored a result more strongly than the evidence,
IIT would predict group depolarization, with the jury moving closer to
the less extreme scale value of the evidence.
Kaplan and L. Miller 36 show how this weighted averaging model of
information integration yields a simple account of the polarizing effect
of group discussion. They begin with the assumption that the predeliberation positions of the members will frequently reflect a combination of arguments tending in one direction, and an initial bias or
37
predisposition tending toward neutrality or the opposite direction.
The effect of deliberation is to increase the weight of the arguments,
thereby reducing the moderating effect of the initial disposition. This
notion can be illustrated by its application to the jury: 38 its members
begin with a predisposition toward the case. This may be a posture of
studied neutrality, or it may reflect bias or partiality. All that is necessary is that this initial disposition pull the jurors away from the direction of the evidence. Consequently, before deliberation the juror's
position is a weighted combination of the evidence presented and his
initial disposition, in combination less extreme than the evidence alone.
What deliberation does is to increase the weight of the evidence,
thereby giving comparatively less weight to the neutral or antagonistic
initial disposition. Thus, polarization occurs.
Kaplan and his colleagues have tested in several interesting ways
their hypothesis about the debiasing effect of jury deliberation. In one
experiment, 139 jurors were asked to compose and exchange notes listing
the five facts about the case they regarded as most influential. These
notes were intercepted, and each juror received a note with either the
same proportion of guilty/not guilty facts that he had submitted, or the
diagnosticity and salience, giving them their most frequent, and certainly their most useful, meaning.
135. Kaplan & Kemmerick, supra note 133.
136. Kaplan & L. Miller, .4 Model of Cognitive Processesin Jurors, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH SOC. PSYCH. 48 (1979).
137. Id. at 54.
138. Id.
139. Kaplan, Discussion of PolarizationEffects in a Modified Jury Decision Paraigm:Informational Influences, 40 SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977).
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opposite proportion. Not surprisingly, the latter opposite-proportion
jurors moved toward a more moderate position than they had previously held. What is of interest is that the jurors who received facts in
the same proportion as those they had listed shifted to more extreme
positions. Kaplan and L. Miller view this as a debiasing effect, arguing
as follows:
If pre-deliberation judgments had been based solely on the evidence,
no shift should have occurred. That there was a shift supports the notion that a more neutral value (the initial impression) is being utilized
in judgment and that its effect is being reduced by the additional information . . . integrated as a consequence of deliberation. 4 °

A further experiment 14 suggested that it is not mere repetition, but the
sharing of different perspectives on the information presented at trial,
that causes the evidence to assume greater importance. Homogeneous
juries were composed of members who had heard the evidence in the
same order; heterogeneous juries included members who had heard
two different sequences, and thus presumably had different facts salient
to them. The judgments of heterogeneous juries shifted more, indicating the greater impact of non-redundant information. For the experimenters, presenting the evidence in different orders was a way of
operationalizing the diverse information actually salient to jurors as a
result of differences in attention, memory, and information processing:
Over the course of a long and involved trial, given all the inherent distractions in the courtroom, all facts may not be equally memorable, nor
will all jurors remember the same facts when they integrate them into
predeliberation judgments. It remains for deliberation to reintroduce
facts memorable
to other jurors for subsequent integration into the
42
judgment. 1
This explanation finds independent support in the previously cited
work of Dashiell and others, 43 which showed that the group's accuracy
in recalling both events and testimony about events consistently surpassed that of its individual members. These studies suggest that even
if deliberation does not always increase the supply of facts available to
the participants, it does present the facts with slightly differing recollections and sharpens participants' memories of the evidence presented.
The appeal of Kaplan and L. Miller's explanation lies partly in its
economy; like the social-decision-rule account, it explains the extremity
shifts without invoking a special polarization process. All that is necessary is that the members of the group discuss the evidence presented,
increasing its preponderance over their unarticulated initial disposi140. Kaplan & L. Miller, supra note 136, at 55.
141. Kaplan & L. Miller, Judgmentsand Group Discussion. Effects of Presentationand Memory
Factorson Polarization,40 SOCIOMETRY 337 (1977).
142. Id. at 342.
143. See notes 103-04 supra.
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tions. Unlike other cognitive accounts, lIT does not claim 44that group
members slant their arguments in the dominant direction.'
The only "values" or "tendencies" that IIT needs to consider are the
scale value (or probativeness) and the weight (or importance) of the
information received. The claim of lIT is simply that group decisions
will reflect this scale value more closely after deliberation, while any
145
other values affecting initial judgments will decline in importance.
Kaplan's account makes two major assumptions in predicting that
deliberation will consistently reduce bias. First, it is premised on the
self-restraint of the jury: if juries routinely discuss the biasing factors
as well as the evidence, the comparative importance of the evidence
may not increase. Second, it assumes that discussion of the evidence
will not change its scale value significantly, even though in the cases of
greatest interest the jurors will enter deliberation with strong biases in
the opposite direction. 46 If these factors distort the evidence by one of
the processes we have discussed above, deliberation may serve to move
the jurors' responses away from the response dictated by the evidence,
and toward greater bias.
Of the two assumptions, the second is more critical. The first merely
limits the prediction of reduced bias to well-behaved jurors. The second assumption is necessary even for disciplined juries. If the evidence
is vulnerable to distortion by 6pposing biases, deliberation may indirectly amplify their effect even if they are never discussed. In the next
144. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 616-17, comment on a division among informational
accounts between those which try to predict the extent of polarization merely by the direction of
the arguments generated in group discussion (that is, which alternative they favor) and those
which insist that the persuasiveness and originality of the arguments must be taken into consideration. These latter accounts would predict a shift in the scale value as well as the weight of the
argument, because polarization will have been achieved by more persuasive and original arguments on the dominant side.
145. Actually, lIT does not claim that deliberation increases the weight of particular items of
evidence, but that it increases the number of items available to each juror, and that this enlarged
set has the same scale value as the jurors' smaller pre-deliberation sets. Kaplan, supra note 139, at
269. This enlargement causes an increase in the total weight of the evidence relative to the initial
disposition. For convenience, then, we will continue to speak of lIT as predicting an increase in
the weight of the evidence through deliberation.
146. "Individuals enter discussion with a judgment reflecting the prevailing tendency of information, but not as extreme. Subsequent discussion, provided it is similar in value to the original
information base, increases the information integrated by the individual, offsetting the more neutral initial impression and thereby polarizing the post-discussion response." Id. (emphasis added).
The proviso that the scale value of the information remain the same is not necessary to account for
polarization. See note 144 supra. It becomes critical when the account is applied to jury decisionmaking. If deliberation is to make juror judgments conform to the prevailing tendency of the
evidence, discussion must not alter the scale value of that evidence in either direction. If deliberation were to cause the scale value to shift even further from the initial predispositions of the jurors,
it might result in an "overcompensation," with the resulting verdict being more extreme than the
evidence warranted.
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two sections, we will review research that suggests the possibility of this
kind of distortion.
IV.

WHAT VALUES WILL BE HEIGHTENED
BY GROUP DELIBERATION?

IIT makes a simple and optimistic prediction about the effect of
group deliberation on extra-legal influences: group deliberation will
reduce the impact of extra-legal influences by diminishing their comparative importance. In contrast, the other accounts of group polarization previously discussed make no such general claim. Whether the
putative source of polarization is value comparison or information exchange, an extra-legal influence will be amplified only if it represents a
dominant value in the group, and then only if that dominant value will
be strengthened by group discussion. IIT attempts to avoid these complications by maintaining that the only value magnified by deliberation
is the tendency of the evidence itself to support one side or the other. If
this simplified assumption proves to be untenable, and we argue that it
is, the researcher attempting to predict the effect of deliberation on a
particular type of non-evidentiary influence must address two threshhold questions. First, what is the dominant attitude of the group with
respect to this extra-legal factor? Second, is this attitude one likely to
be polarized by group discussion? Both questions raise serious difficulties in the application of laboratory research on groups to a field setting.
How does one determine in advance what will be the dominant tendency for a particular value? In the laboratory research on group polarization, the dominant response has been determined either by
averaging the individual responses on some quantitative scale,' 47 or by
manipulating the choice situation faced by the subjects so that a particular response or value is almost certain to be dominant. 148 Using the
first approach, the researcher locates the mean response of individual
subjects on a questionnaire item such as: "How strongly do you favor
nuclear disarmament?" (on a 1-9 scale) or "What must the odds in
favor of success be before you would advise this?" (from 1-in-10 to 10in- 10). If the mean individual response exceeds the midpoint in one
direction, the post-deliberation responses should extend even further in
that direction. The problem is that the mathematical mean (for example, 5.5 chances in 10) may not correspond to the psychological midpoint; the felt point of neutrality on a continuum between opposed
values such as risk and caution. 149 One alternative would be to define
147. Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 603-04.
148. Id.
149.

Id.
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the psychological midpoint as that point beyond which responses will
polarize in either direction. While this definition is meaningful (because it does predict consistent polarization, depending on the location
of the initial mean with respect to that point), it deprives the account of
predictive power: before the group starts to deliberate, there is no way
to know where that point falls; hence, there is no way of predicting the
direction in which the initial positions will shift.' 0 One final strategy is
suggested by S. F. Sonaike, 5 ' who found much sharper divergence between jury damage awards than between initial individual judgments
in a mock negligence trial. She found that groups whose members initially favored awards higher than the overall individual mean tended to
polarize upward; those with lower than average initial means tended to
polarize downward. 5 2 But there were several striking exceptions, and
this technique has clear limitations. On many issues, groups have been
shown to polarize consistently in the same direcion,' 53 suggesting that
the dominant pole is the same for all groups, whether their individual
means are above or below average.
By designing the choice situation to elicit a dominant tendency, the
second approach tries to ensure that individual responses will fall
closer to one extreme.' 5 4 In studies specifically applying group polarization to jury decisions, this preference-rigging has been achieved by
presenting a pre-tested case strongly favoring one side or the other,' 55
or by selecting jurors for their strong predispositions toward case-relevant values like authority, punishment, or crime.' 56 In both types of
jury polarization studies, a striking post-discussion amplification of individual or group responses has been consistently demonstrated.
While these are interesting findings, their applicability to real juries
is severely limited by several considerations. First, the adversary system of jury selection almost guarantees that the jurors chosen will have
no dominant predisposition concerning the case. Second, the cases that
we are concerned about are those on which judges and juries diverge.
As indicated in the discussion of The American Jury, these are generally close cases.' 5 7 Thus, the choice situation that juries face in the
cases that concern us here will not, in contrast to the experimental
materials, have a strong tendency to favor one side or the other. If
150. Id.
151. Sonaike, The Influence of Jury Deliberation on Juror Perceptionof Trial, Credibility, and
Damage Awards, 1978 B.Y.L. REV. 889.
152. Id. at 902.
153. Many examples of consistent polarization on specific issues are cited by Myers & Lamm,
supra note 91, at 604-05.
154. Id. at 604.
155. Id. at 606.
156. Id.
157. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 149-62.
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group polarization occurs in close cases with significant extra-legal influences, it will rarely take effect simply by heightening an already
strong tendency to convict. Especially when there is no prevailing sentiment on guilt per se, a broader question arises: What values and response-tendencies on the part of individual jurors will be subject to
group polarization?
Research applicable to this second question is not readily available.
Studies of group polarization have generally presented groups with a
choice along a single value continuum. In the original choice dilemma
questionnaires, the decision was limited to choosing one of ten levels of
risk in various hypothetical situations.' 5 8 In more recent experiments,
the choice may have allowed for a broader range of considerations, but
disagreement was still largely confined to differences along a single dimension: pacifism vs. militarism, negative vs. positive faculty appraisals, generosity vs. frugality.' 59
An actual decision about guilt or liability, however, does not involve
one issue or value, but many. A host of preferences and judgments lies
behind the initial votes that jurors cast: the assignment of probative
value to specific pieces of evidence and to the evidence as a whole,
general dispositions toward broad categories of evidence, sentiments
toward the participants and the applicable laws, and differing
probability threshholds for decision. The initial distribution of votes
may result from any combination of such beliefs and response tendencies. The presence of even a strong majority will not necessarily reflect
a single dominant value. Deliberation may in fact reveal to jurors that
they share a verdict preference for reasons they find mutually unacceptable.
As previously shown, lIT deals with this multiplicity of values by
assuming that deliberation will involve discussion about only one of
them-the probative value of the evidence. It claims that deliberation
will generally leave the scale value of the evidence unchanged, while
greatly increasing its weight.' 6 ° Other accounts impose no restrictions
on the type or number of case-related values that may be polarized by
group discussion. 16' Before questioning the simplifying assumptions of
IIT, it is appropriate to suggest the difficulties that an unrestricted polarization account must face.
Consider the previously cited study by Izzett and Leginski' 6 2 on
158. See Myers & Lamm, supra note 91, at 602.
159. Id. at 604-05.
160.

See note 146 supra.

161. The "value hypothesis" and similar accounts (discussed in note 125 supra) require that
the dominant tendency of the initial majority reflect a strong cultural value in order for polarization to occur, but this restriction is not very useful for prediction.
162. Izzett & Leginski, supra note 62.
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group discussion and defendant attractiveness. The authors presented
163
subject-jurors with the case summary used by Landy and Aronson.
One group of subjects read a description of the defendant as an attractive individual; the others read the extremely unflattering description
quoted earlier in this article.' 6 4 After reading the case material, each
individual juror was asked to sentence the defendant to a prison term
of between one and twenty-five years and to rate his guilt on a one-tonine point scale. At this stage, the authors replicated Landy and Aronson's "attractiveness effect": the unsavory defendant was sentenced to
significantly more years than the upstanding one. 165 The guilt ratings
were uniformly high. Apparently, the case description left no doubt
about the defendant's criminal negligence. 166 Subjects were then assigned to groups in which they were to announce their sentence, state
their reasons, and then freely discuss the case. After this session they
again responded to questions on sentencing and guilt.
As a result of polarization, what differences in the post-deliberation
responses would be expected? Any number of effects might reasonably
be predicted. Perhaps the most likely result would be a further divergence between the two defendants, with the attractive one getting an
even lighter, and the unattractive one an even harsher, sentence. This
outcome would be expected on either of two grounds. Discussion
might "liberate" jurors from the "external norm" of impartiality, allowing them to give fuller expression to their sympathies and aversions.' 67 Alternatively, more persuasive arguments for low and high
sentences might be expected
in the cases of attractive and unattractive
168
defendants, respectively.
In fact, Izzett and Leginski found that the post-deliberation sentences
for the unattractive defendant declined significantly, while those for the
attractive defendant remained roughly the same. As a result, there was
difference in the post-deliberation sentences for the two
no significant
69
defendants. 1
These results are consistent with lIT, which would have predicted at
least some convergence on the sentences. The core of evidence relevant
to sentencing differed less than did the totality of information about the
two defendants. Thus, a discussion of the evidence would be expected
to reduce differences in sentences for the two defendants by giving
163.
164.
165.
166.
fore, it
167.
168.
169.

Landy & Aronson, supra note 38.
See text accompanying note 49 supra.
Izzett & Leginski, supra note 62, at 275.
Id. at 276. This 'ceiling' effect would conceal any effect of attractiveness on guilt; therewill not be discussed further.
See text accompanying note 124 supra.
See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
lzzett & Leginski, supra note 62, at 276.
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greater weight to the common elements of their cases. The overlap
would not be expected to be complete, however, because the evidence a
jury could legitimately consider for sentencing would not be the same
for the two: the defendants differed on age, employment, and criminal
record, all considerations relevant to sentencing and likely to have been
adduced in deliberation. The fact that only the sentence of the unattractive defendant changed could be explained in terms of the composition of the information about his case. It may be that the proportion of
unfavorable information about the unattractive defendant that lacked
sufficient relevance to merit discussion was much greater than the proportion of favorable information about the attractive defendant similarly excluded from discussion.
How do Izzett and Leginski themselves account for these resultsresults which would not appear to reflect polarization toward the dominant poles of the two cases? They suggest that the same value is being
polarized in both cases-leniency. 7 ' But why should leniency have
been a dominant value? The authors note that the mean individual
sentence for both defendants was below the mathematical midpoint of
twelve and one-half years.' 7 ' As we have pointed out, however, the
numerical mean may not correspond to the psychological point of neutrality; therefore, an initial position as close to the numerical midpoint
72
as that for both defendants may not indicate a lenient disposition.
Izzett and Leginski offer an additional reason for expecting leniency to
be a dominant value in both cases: "The Ss in this study were college
students at a campus not far from the [recent] Attica prison riots ...
Thus, it would seem reasonable to assume that the inadequacies of our
penal system were salient. . . . If so, we could expect an evocation of a
humanitarian or leniency attitude. . . .'"'I The ad hoc character of

this explanation should be apparent. In both cases, a severity shift
could have been explained equally well by the same events, especially
if the campus were close enough to Attica for a large number of students to have had acquaintances among the prison staff.
Assuming that a leniency effect was present, why did it affect only
the sentence of the unattractive defendant? Here, Izzett and Leginski
draw from the literature on group problem-solving. They suggest a
"Eureka" effect operating at the stage where subjects gave reasons for
their individual sentences: "If the S verbalizes his attitude toward the
defendant as a reason for his sentence, the group is likely to reject this
This is a more modest version of the claim
reason as inappropriate."'
170. Id. at 277.
171. Id.
172. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
173. Izzett & Leginski, supra note 62, at 278.
174. Id. at 273. Thus, the leniency shift was heightened for the unattractive defendant and
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implicit in lIT: that inappropriate reasons for sentencing, such as the
defendant's socioeconomic status or physical appearance, simply will
not get raised in discussion. It shares a weakness that we will shortly
explore-it does not deal with the possibility that considerations which
are suppressed or dismissed will indirectly influence the discussion of
the "admissible" evidence by one of the processes we have discussed in
section II above.
The interplay of different values in jury decision-making suggested
by Izzett and Leginski is raised most strikingly by cases in which an
initial majority, although favoring one verdict, eventually reverses itself. Any polarization account which treats guilt or liability as a unitary value will have trouble with such cases: the group appears to pull
away from the dominant tendency of its members. These cases pose a
problem for lIT as well. Movement away from the initial majority
would be predicted only if the initial disposition, far from being neutral, favored an outcome opposed by the evidence so strongly that it
masked the direction of the evidence in initial judgments. A turnabout
could occur only if deliberation reversed the comparative weights of
evidence and initial bias, and this would require a fairly vigorous discussion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that these reversals occur
in cases with unusually strong initial bias or weak evidence.' 7 5 Thus,
cases of reversal raise doubts about IIT's assumption that only the
dominant tendency of the evidence will be heightened by deliberation.
These problematic reversals occur with significant frequency in cases
in which an initial majority favors conviction.' 7 6 The relatively high
incidence of turnabouts in these cases suggests that the critical shift occurs on a dimension largely ignored by polarization research, and unaccounted for by IIT: the threshhold for decision, or in legal terms, the
standard of proof. We have already suggested that extra-legal influences may affect the outcome of a case by altering the decision threshhold. What we now consider is the possibility that the standard of
proof in criminal cases may itself reflect a value likely to be strengthened by deliberation: the presumption of innocence.
The evidence for group shifts toward a higher standard of proof is
mostly circumstantial. In both laboratory and field studies, the rate of
reversal for initial majorities favoring conviction is appreciably higher
depressed for the attractive defendant by the jury's rejection of character considerations that may
have influenced individual judgments.
175. As noted in text at 21 supra, Kalven & Zeisel do not report the incidence of judge-jury
disagreements or other indicia of bias for these cases of reversal. While the case used by Nemeth,
infra note 180, appeared both to favor the prosecution (73% of the individuals reading it favored
conviction) and to contain pro-defense bias (a suggestion that the defendant was a victim of adultery), it was not striking in either respect.
176. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 487-89; Nemeth, infra note 180.
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than for initial majorities favoring acquittal. 77
As noted earlier, Kalven and Zeisel found that actual juries with an
initial majority favoring acquittal ended up convicting two percent of
the time, while juries with an initial majority favoring conviction acquitted five percent of the time.'7 8 Juries initially favoring conviction
and acquittal ended up "hung" nine percent and seven percent of the
time, respectively 79-a much less significant difference than their reversal rates. This latter finding may suggest that the higher frequency
of turnabouts for initially pro-conviction juries is not solely a result of
the greater stubbornness of pro-acquittal minorities.
The results of a recent experiment by C. Nemeth 8 ' offer further evidence of a conservative shift in criminal jury deliberations. Nemeth
showed subjects a videotaped trial; then she selected juries based on
individual opinions as to the defendant's guilt. Six-person juries were
formed in which either two or four of the members initially favored
conviction, and the remaining members initially favored acquittal. Juries were required to reach a decision either by majority vote or by
unanimity. Over one-half of the pro-conviction juries under both decision rules did not convict. In contrast, only one of the initially proacquittal juries shifted under each decision rule. 8 '
Finally, Bray and Noble' 82 discovered that when juries were selected
for their authoritarian leanings, initial majorities for conviction reversed themselves two and one-half times as frequently as initial majorities for acquittal. These authoritarian juries continued to show the
predicted shift to harsher punishment, indicating that the opposite
83
trend in verdicts was due to a factor specific to guilt determination.1
While the acquittal trend may be partly explained by the overall weakness of the case against the defendant--over half of the individual authoritarian jurors voted to acquit' 8 4-this feature cannot fully explain
the reversal in juries where a majority did favor conviction.
The repeated finding that pro-conviction majorities are more reversal-prone suggests that such reversals result from a preference for a
high conviction threshhold, reinforced by group discussion. The members of a jury with an initial majority favoring conviction may largely
agree on the probative value of the evidence, and differ only on the
177. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, supra note 7, at 487-89.
178.

Id.

179. Id.
180. Nemeth, Rules Governing Jury Deliberations.- 4 Considerationof Some Recent Changes, in
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 169 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth, & N. Vidmar eds. 1976).

181. Id. at 175.
182. Bray & Noble, Authoritarianismand Decisions of Mock Jurors.- Evidence of Jury Bias and
Group Polarization,36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1424 (1978).

183. Id. at 1427.
184. Id. at 1428.
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probability of guilt that constitutes "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
In this situation a criminal jury is faced with a simple choice dilemma:
what are the lowest odds of guilt for which you will vote to convict?
When the issue before the jury resolves itself into a question about conviction threshholds, a strong preference for caution and skepticism
should come into play. This preference has been inculcated by the jurors' legal socialization, and has been reinforced by emphatic instructions on the presumption of innocence. 81 5 The value placed on caution
may express itself without explicit discussion, however. The tasks of
evaluating the evidence and setting a standard of proof are closely intertwined, and the preference for a higher threshhold may express itself
in a more critical review of the state's evidence, or an increased willingness to give the defendant "the benefit of the doubt."
After a close analysis of the evidentiary disagreements between
judges and juries, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that eleven per cent of
these differences arose because the jury adopted a stricter standard for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 86 They suggested an explanation
for this higher conviction threshhold, "beyond the likelihood that it reflects a distinctive value held by laymen":
Given the ambiguity of the reasonable doubt formula, it is likely that it
is not understood in the same fashion by all jurors; hence, one could
theoretically rank a population of jurors in terms of their threshholds of
reasonable doubt. . . . If then the group of [twelve] jurors decides
close cases with a higher cut-off point than does a single judge, the
explanation may reside simply in the unanimity requirement. The jury,
to avoid disagreement would tend in the direction of its most stringent
member.' 87
But the jury would tend in this direction just because stringency is a
shared value, to which the more conviction-prone members would defer.
Writing at a time when group shifts were still thought to be limited to
risk, Kalven and Zeisel ventured an account of the jury's higher conviction threshhold in terms of a conservative shift in group deliberation.
An open-ended polarization account like Izzett and Leginski's could
accommodate this finding merely by adding to the list of values affected by deliberation. For lIT, the consequences of this finding are
more serious. It cannot be easily accounted for in terms of variable
weight and scale value. A decision threshhold is not part of the information that jurors must integrate, to be later emphasized or ignored in
deliberation. Rather, it is a standard brought to bear (at least in theory) after the information has been integrated. Although this standard
185. See Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, supra note 81.
186. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 187.

187. Id. at 189.
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of proof may express itself in the manner in which the evidence is evaluated, this hardly helps lIT to account for its polarization. If a higher
standard of proof is reflected in a harsher evaluation of the evidence,
then deliberation has affected the scale value of the evidence as well as
its weight, contrary to the basic assumption that IIT makes about the
accuracy of deliberation.
V.

EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS AND GROUP DELIBERATION

We now turn directly to the assumption that deliberation preserves
the scale value of the evidence, from which the lIT account of biasreduction acquires its appealing simplicity. 88 A review of the various
forms of extra-legal influence outlined above' 8 9 should raise doubts
about the extent to which group discussion can be insulated from legally irrelevant considerations.
Before citing experiments which challenge the assumption that deliberation is bias-resistant, we should consider the evidence adduced in
support of that claim. Several experiments cited above indicated that
group discussion leads to greater accuracy in evidence recall. 9 ° None
of these studies, however, required jurors to wrestle with strong predispositions about the case they were reviewing. Until it is shown how
juries hold up against the systematic distortion of biasing factors, as
well as the vagaries of individual recall, there can be no confidence that
deliberation will preserve the scale vahie of the evidence in normal trial
conditions.
Kaplan claimed that several experiments done by himself and others
put jurors to this test, and that they held up rather well. 9 ' In each of
these experiments, groups of jurors were either selected for, or manipulated to have, opposing biases. Their individual judgments were elicited before and after deliberation, or with or without some other
measure thought to reduce bias. The groups with opposing biases were
expected to differ sharply before, or in the absence of, this measure.
Kaplan assumed that a convergence in the responses of the two groups
following the supposedly bias-reducing measure indicated a shift away
188. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 68-85 supra.
190. See Dashiell, supra note 6, at 1136-37; Kelly & Thibaut, supra note 104.
191. Kaplan & L. Miller, supra note 136, at 50-53. Indirect support for the objectivity of
deliberation can be found in Kaplan & Kemmerick, supra note 133, at 498, where it was shown
that "a negatively evaluated defendant biases judgment against himself whether the evidence is
incriminating or exonerating, and to the same extent." It appears that the character information
was combined non-interactively with the case evidence, which suggests that it had no effect on the
way the admissible evidence was evaluated. If the character evidence were shaping the evaluation
of the evidence, one might have expected an interaction between the type of bias and the type of
evidence. Thus, the evaluation of the admissible evidence by non-deliberating jurors appears not
to be affected by this kind of bias.
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from bias and toward the value of the evidence, which was identical for
both groups. Bias was introduced in different ways: by obnoxious conduct on the part of one of the attorneys (or the judge),' 9 2 by exposing
the jurors to incriminating pre-trial publicity,'9 3 and by selecting jurors
who were either very high or very low on a scale of authoritarian attitudes. 19 4 The bias-reducing manipulating also varied: for the jurors
varying in authoritarianism, it was a statement affirming the reliability
of the evidence; for the jurors exposed to pre-trial publicity, it was the
presentation of the case itself; and for jurors subjected to courtroom
misconduct, it was the opportunity to deliberate. Each of these measures was expected to heighten the importance of the evidence and
thereby reduce the comparative importance of the biasing factor.
Although the predicted convergence in the responses of the two
groups was found in all three experiments, indicating a reduction of
bias, these results provide only weak evidence for the objective character of deliberation. In the one experiment actually utilizing deliberation to increase the salience of the evidence, the only competing
influence was attorney misbehavior. 9 ' Not surprisingly, deliberating
jurors were able to disregard their irritation, but this says little about
their ability to resist more powerful extra-legal influences. The findings
on the reduced impact of pre-trial publicity and authoritarianism might
seem even more encouraging. Those potentially strong biasing factors
were effectively neutralized by measures which merely increased the
salience of the admissible evidence. But these results must be viewed
with caution.
First, deliberation itself was not the bias-reducing measure. Second,
the measures employed-presentation of the case, and assurance of reliability--did not have the same potential as deliberation to distort, as
well as to highlight, the evidence. Finally, -enhanced reliability may
have reduced the effect of bias, not by increasing the weight of the evidence, but by discouraging its distortion. Kaplan and L. Miller concede that their results permit "[a] tenuous implication" that "when
evidence is questionable, persons. . . will discount information inconsistent with their bias."' 96 Their findings may thus be fully consistent
with the conclusion of Ostrom, Werner, and Saks that the effect of bias
is found in the differential evaluation of the evidence.' 9 7 But if bias
192. Kaplan & L. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCH. 1443 (1975) (experiment 3).

193. L. Zanzola, The Role of Pretrial Publicity in the Trial Process and Jury Deliberation
(1977) (unpublished study at Northern Illinois University).
194. Kaplan & L. Miller, supra note 192, at 1444-50 (experiments I & 2).
195. Id. at 1450-54 (experiment 3).
196. Id. at 1448-49 (experiment 2).
197. See Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, supra note 81 & text accompanying note 211. Kaplan and
Miller claim that this alternative explanation is plausible only for experiment 2, where there were
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cannot be "localized in [an] initial impression"' 9 8 that will fade with
inattention, deliberation will not necessarily reduce its impact.
Even if the above experiments support the claim of objectivity in
deliberation, other studies have obtained less encouraging results. Numerous experiments have shown that restrictive instructions may backfire, and thus magnify the influence of factors that jurors have been
exhorted to ignore.' 99 This effect has been found for deliberating
groups, as well as for non-deliberating, individuals. The first study to
reveal this boomerang effect was probably one done by Broeder for the
Chicago Jury Project. 200 Broeder compared the damage awards of juries that never learned of the defendant's liability insurance with both
those that received this information without restrictive instructions and
those that were instructed not to consider it in their deliberations. The
last group of juries gave significantly higher awards than the uninstructed, as well as the uninformed, juries. Recently, Oros and Elman
found that jurors deliberating in groups and rendering individual judgments were harsher in convicting and sentencing after being given specific instructions to "decide on the disputed facts without regard to [the
unfavorable] non-evidential aspects of the defendant."' 20 '
There are at least two reported studies in which deliberating juries
appeared to be influenced by extra-legal factors more than individual
jurors. We have already discussed Hans and Doob's finding that the
20 2
Mcdefendant's record affected group, but not individual, verdicts.
Guire and Bermant conducted a study in which they found that jurors
increased the harshness of their verdicts during deliberations following
a trial with a female defense attorney. 2°3 The increased harshness created a sex-of-attorney effect for juries that had not appeared in individual judgments.
When group deliberation preserves or magnifies the effect of extrafacts congruent with both biases. They claim that in experiment I (which used two cases, one with
exclusively exonerating, the other with exclusively incriminating, facts) there was no room for
selective emphasis or weighing because all the facts in a given case pointed in the same direction.
Kaplan and L. Miller, supra note 192, at 1449. Even if the cases were constructed as claimed,
Kaplan & L. Miller seem to forget that Ostrom, Werner, and Saks found bias to affect the scale
value as well as the weight of the evidence. In their view, bias could alter the incriminating or
exonerating set of facts by distorting their probative value. Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, supra note
81.
198. Kaplan & L. Miller, supra note 192, at 1449.
199. Eg., Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, supra note 45; Wolf& Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible
Evidence and Level ofJudicialAdmonishment to Disregardon the Judgments ofMock Jurors, 7 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 205 (1977).

200. Broeder, supra note 68, at 754.
201. Oros & Elman, Impact of Judge's Instructions upon Jurors' Decisions- The Cautionary
Charge in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH SOC. PsYCH. 28 (1979).

202. See text accompanying notes 64-65.
203. McGuire & Bermant, Individual and Group Decisions in Response to a Mock Trial- A
Methodological Note, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 220 (1977).
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legal factors, as it appears to do in the above studies, it is necessary to
question the form of influence at work. Are jurors explicitly raising the
excluded considerations, or are they yielding to them in a less obvious,
defiant way? As Kalven and Zeisel observed, juries will rarely conduct
their deliberations in the teeth of the law. Juries may be more likely
than individuals to recall and to enforce the restrictive instructions they
receive.2 "4 Unlike individuals mulling over a body of evidence, juries
have a clear way of operationalizing a restrictive instruction: they can
honor it simply by declining to discuss the excluded information. In at
least two of the cited experiments, it was actually found that the ineffective instructions were at least publicly observed. Broeder taperecorded his deliberations, and learned that the instructed juries did
not bring up the defendant's insurance, however much they may have
been influenced by it.2" 5 Hans and Doob, as previously mentioned,
found that their juries did not discuss the highly prejudicial matter of
the defendant's criminal record.2" 6
But this self-restraint need not be universal. Juries may be more
likely than individuals to ignore restrictive instructions concerning at
least some highly probative or equitably significant information. The
"liberation" account of group polarization would predict such a result:
individual jurors who had repressed their inclination to use the excluded information, in conformity with a legal norm, would become
emboldened by the discovery that others shared this inclination. This
would be much more likely to happen in the case of information that
reasonable men might consider important, such as the propensity revealed in the defendant's prior record, or severe but legally insufficient
provocation given by the victim. In the case of such excluded considerations, group consensus might give legitimacy to a strong but otherwise
resistable temptation. This possibility is only speculative, however, because no research of which we are aware has both varied the probative
and equitable value of excluded evidence and monitored the resulting
group deliberation.
We already have support from Hans and Doob for the second type
of influence-the distortion of the evidence in the direction of the ex204. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 165. D. Colasanto and J. Sanders argue that
the far greater conformity to the legal norms they found in the decisions of deliberating subjects
was due largely to their considerably greater recall of the judge's instructions: "Differences between deliberators and non-deliberators can probably be accounted for by the fact that it is more
difficult for individuals deciding a case alone to remember correctly and understand all of the
judge's instructions. In a group discussion of the issues there is likely to be at least one person
who can remember any given part of the instructions and who will volunteer information on the
legal points where appropriate." D. Colasanto & J. Sanders, supra note 46, at 22.
205. Broeder, supra note 68, at 754.
206. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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cluded information.2" 7 Doob suggested that this effect failed to appear
in pre-deliberation judgments merely because they were made without
a chance to consider the restricted evidence.2 °8 It may be, however,
that group discussion not merely permitted, but facilitated the distortion of the evidence toward the preferred outcome. In his discussion of
groupthink, Janis argued that groups can be more effective than individuals at rationalizing the prevailing inclinations of their members.2" 9
This may be true in part because groups simply come up with more
reasons for anything than do single individuals, as problem-solving
literature has shown. But groups may also serve a mutual reassurance
function by making their participants feel secure in their questionable
treatment of the evidence. The snowballing rationalization that groups
can generate is unlikely to be countered by the kind of "Eureka" corrective that Izzett and Leginski expected to find.2 1 ° Because the excluded information is not discussed, it will be hard for critics within the
group to enforce the rule against its consideration. The best that these
opponents can do is to demand consistency in the appraisal of the evidence, and to suggest that the imbalances which do appear have a discreditable source. But where the excluded information radically alters
the jurors' perception of the case, or raises universally acknowledged
equitable concerns, there may be no one willing or able to adopt a critical standpoint.
Whether or not group discussion encourages the slanting of evidence
toward a favorable result, there is no reason why it should be proof
against a favorable result. Ostrom, Werner, and Saks demonstrated
that individual differences in attitudes toward the presumption of innocence had a marked effect on the weight and scale value that jurors
assigned to items of evidence. 21 ' Jurors with an initial bias toward conviction gave incriminating items more weight and probative value than
did jurors with a pro-acquittal bias. If the importance and probative
value of a piece of evidence may vary with an individual's predisposition, its inferential impact on a group may be similarly affected by its
members' predilections. Where individuals differ widely in their outcome-dispositions, deliberation may balance out their distortions to
achieve a reasonable approximation of objectivity. But where an extralegal consideration strongly disposes most of the jurors toward a single
outcome, deliberation will merely give them an opportunity to reinforce and to legitimize their preference.
Where does this leave us? IIT claims a consistent effect of group
207. Id.
208. Doob, supra note 65, at 142.
209.

Janis, Groupthink, in PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 43 (Nov. 1971).

210. Izzett & Leginski, supra note 62, at 273.
211. See text accompanying note 197 supra See also, Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, supra note 81.
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deliberation on external bias, but we have seen in the last two sections
that its assumption of representative discussion may not be tenable.
While deliberation can be expected to increase the weight of the admissible evidence, it will not always do so in a manner that preserves its
inferential impact. It may increase the weight of evidence selectively,
emphasizing those items that are associated with or support the same
conclusion as the excluded information. It may also distort the scale
value of the evidence, making it appear more probative when it is consonant with the jurors' outcome-preferences or sentiments. Finally,
group accord may sometimes encourage jurors to defy restrictive instructions, and in deliberation to raise matters that they would, in their
private evaluation of the evidence, attempt to suppress.
VI.

THE EFFECT OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE AND DEFENDANT
IDENTITY ON INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP JUDGMENTS:
AN EXPERIMENT

Without the assurance that deliberation will consistently reduce bias,
we are left to consider its effect on the multiplicity of factors that may
be raised in a trial. Izzett and Leginski have provided a foretaste of the
complications.2" 2 The impression of great variability in the values subject to polarization is reinforced by considering the scattered instances
of jury polarization we have found. With different case material and
differently composed juries, deliberation has been shown to heighten
21 4 and stringency about proof,21 5
the values of leniency, 21 3 harshness,
as well as to increase the biasing effect of the defendant's record 21 6 and
the attorney's sex.217 Clearly there has not been enough consistency in
their findings to encourage broad generalizations about value shifts in
juries. We have a more modest goal in the final section of the article.
We present the results of an experiment that investigates our principal
concern-the interplay of legal and extra-legal factors in group decision-making-in a realistic legal setting. We doubt that a general rule
could be developed that would predict how group deliberation will affect the impact of evidentiary and non-evidentiary concerns, but we do
intend to show that acquaintance with the various ways in which
212. See Izzett & Leginski, supra note 62. See text accompanying notes 162-74 supra.
213. Id.
214. Vidmar, Group Induced Shifts in Simulated Jury Decisions (1972) (paper delivered at
annual meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association).
215. Nemeth, supra note 180. It should be noted that it is the present authors, not Nemeth,
who interpret her results to show increased stringency about proof. We place a similar interpretation on Bray and Noble's findings. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
216. Hans & Doob, supra note 64.
217. McGuire & Bermant, supra note 203.
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groups inhibit and facilitate extra-legal influences can yield useful predictions in specific cases.
In a study conducted last year, we examined the effects of two trial
variables largely unexplored in the psychological literature: the use of
demonstrative evidence by the plaintiff, and the corporate status of the
defendant. We chose these factors because they have been a matter of
persistent concern to trial practitioners (especially in civil trials, which
have received comparatively little attention from psychologists), and
they present the opportunity to study the types of emotional and equitable influences to which jurors actually are subject. Demonstrative evidence has both informational value and emotional impact. Because of
this combination, its admission is a predictable source of contention
between attorneys, and its use by the jury a matter of great interest.
The corporate status of the defendant raises powerful equitable concerns about the ability to pay and the distribution of loss: policy issues
which the law prefers to see resolved by legislatures, not juries. These
issues, fraught with legal, ethical, and psychological significance, are
raised every time a plaintiff seeks to introduce demonstrative evidence
of his injuries against a corporate defendant.
We begin with some background regarding these issues. Demonstrative evidence includes all phenomena that can convey a relevant firsthand sense impression to the trier of fact, as opposed to those which
21 8
serve merely to report the second-hand sense impression of others.
Pictures, models, and diagrams are among the types of demonstrative
evidence frequently employed. Because such forms of representation
are frequently used in personal injury cases, they often depict fairly
gruesome injuries; sometimes an object itself, such as a surgically removed uterus, is preserved in evidence. 19 In the past, this type of presentation was the source of heated controversy, with many judges and
legal commentators believing that such evidence would tend to arouse
jurors' emotions and sympathies and would blind them to the more
pertinent facts of the case.2 2 ° In recent years, courts have become less
anxious about the capacity of jurors to retain their objectivity in the
face of emotionally arousing presentations. 22 1 This shift in attitude
may reflect a generally heightened confidence in jury performance over
the past two decades. 222 The controversy over the emotion-arousing
218. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 524 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
219. E.g., People v. Tilley, 411 I11.473, 104 N.E.2d 499 (1952).
220. See, e.g., Cady, Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L. REV. 333 (1967).
221. See, e.g., Napier v. Commonwealth, 426 S.w.2d 121, 122-23 (Ky. 1968). "The time has
come when it should be presumed that a person capable of sitting as a juror in a murder case can,
without losing his head, bear the sight of a photograph [of the victim.]"
222. R. Simon notes that the publication of The American Juryand other Chicago Jury Project
studies relieved some of the most pressing doubts about jury competence and self-discipline. R.
SIMON, supra note 1, at xiii.
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qualities of certain types of demonstrative evidence appears to have
been swept under the rug. The individual judge has been left to decide
whether a given photograph or demonstration will have more emotional than probative value. This area of discretion is now codified in
the Federal Rules of Evidence22 3 and various state rules.2 24
This fertile area of investigation has been largely ignored by psychologists. One notable exception is Oliver and Griffitt's study of "Emotional Arousal and Objective Judgment. ' 22 5 This experiment examined
the effects of photographs of an injured hand on subsequent juror judgments. Subjects who were allowed to see pictures of the injury in question awarded the plaintiff a significantly larger sum of money than
those subjects who did not see the pictures. The researchers concluded:
The inclusion of the emotion-arousing visual material led to a marked
difference in judgments, regardless of the actual case merits .... As
the legal system is supposed to foster objective evaluation of factual
evidence, it would certainly seem, based on these data, that the decision
of many courts not to admit materials such as these slides is soundly
based.2 26

This study, however, reveals nothing about the probative value of the
pictures: perhaps they made the subjects more fully aware of the true
plight of the plaintiff, more aware than they would have been had they
heard only a verbal description. If this is true, then viewing the pictures may have resulted in a more "just" award. It is impossible to
conclude apriorithat pictures such as these will necessarily lead to an
emotional state that prohibits the jurors from making a rational decision; in fact, the added information they contain may be far more significant than the sympathies they engender.
A second study related to this issue demonstrated that vivid evidence
can sometimes have an impact that is clearly not justified by its informative worth. Farmer and others2 27 compared the results of simulated
trials in which the key witness for one side was presented on videotape,
and the key witness for the other side in a printed transcript. They
varied the side which had the videotaped witness. Although the testimony of these witnesses was identical in the two versions, both sides
did significantly better when their key witness appeared on videotape
rather than in print. 228 This difference could have resulted only as an
223. FED. R. EvID. 403.
224. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1978); N.J. EVID. R. 4.
225. Oliver & Griffitt, Emotional arousal and "objective judgment," 8 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC
Soc'y 399 (1976).
226. Id. at 400.
227. Farmer, Williams, Cundick, Howell, Lee, & Rooker, The Effect ofthe Method ofPresenting Trial Testimony on Juror Decisional Process, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 59 (B.
Sales ed. 1977).
228. Id. at 66-67.
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effect of the vividness of the evidence, and not because it was more
informative. Although vivid evidence can have an excessive impact,
we can never ascertain precisely how much of the effect is excessive in
the typical case where vividness and informativeness are naturally confounded.
It is evident that further research is needed in this area in order to
gauge the various effects of demonstrative evidence on civil juries. It is
likely that these effects would not be uniform throughout all civil cases
but would depend, among other things, upon the identity of the defendant. The capacity of the defendant to pay damages may impose a
ceiling on the jury's heightened sympathy for the victim. One would
not expect any jury to require an individual to pay an award of $127.8
million-the largest single plaintiffs personal injury verdict to date, assessed against Ford Motor Company. 229 That juries consistently award
plaintiffs larger sums when the defendant is a corporation is not surprising. A corporation is much more anonymous and impersonal than
an individual; the responsibility for payment of the award does not lie
with one individual, but is diffused through great numbers of people.
Smige123 ° provided empirical evidence that this is a pervasive attitude
among potential jurors. In his study, subjects revealed that they would
rather steal from large businesses than from the government or from
small businesses. When asked why, they offered such reasons as anonymity, impersonality, bureaucratic inefficiency, and capacity to absorb
the loss. 2 3 From such reasoning, one might suspect that corporations
would be especially vulnerable to certain types of demonstrative evidence in personal injury suits. Indeed, in Illinois CentralRailroadCo.
v. Seitz, the court stated: "There is enough natural and inherent
prejudice in the minds of the jurors against the railroad and other corporations without having it augmented by direct and improper appeals
calculated to arouse the sympathy, passion, or prejudice of the jurors." 232 The prejudicial impact of corporate identity may vary in
scope: the defendant's status may influence jurors only when the
threshhold decision on liability has been made; it may implicitly lower
the standard of proof for liability or raise the standard of due care; or,
at the extreme, the fact of injury may merely provide the occasion for a
limited redistribution of wealth. In our experiment, we sought to narrow this range of possible effects by conceding the liability of the defendant.
229.
lished.
230.
21 AM.
231.
232.

The award in the "Pinto" case was the largest ever at the time Igoe's article was pubSee Igoe, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability, 34 J. Mo. B. 394 (1978).
Smigel, Public Attitudes Toward Stealingas Related to the Size of the Victim Organization,
Soc. REV. 320 (1956).
Id. at 327.
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Seitz, 111 l1.App. 242, 243 (1903).
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We were interested in studying both demonstrative evidence and corporate status in the setting of a single trial. When psychologists want to
test the effect of two or more different factors-here, the nature of the
evidence and the status of the defendant-they employ what is called a
factorial design: a random assignment of subjects to every possible
combination of conditions.2 33 Here, there are four such combinations,
determined by whether the plaintiffs evidence is demonstrative or verbal, and whether the defendant is a corporation or an individual. This
design allows psychologists to study the independent effect of these two
factors (for example, the effect of demonstrative evidence regardless of
corporate status), as well as any effects due to particular combinations
of these factors (for example, demonstrative evidence and corporate
status)-above and beyond their separate effect.
Our primary dependent measure-the response we wanted to compare for the four conditions-was the amount of damages awarded to
the plaintiff. This is a more sensitive measure than a dichotomous verdict of the impact of the manipulated factors.
We presented one group of subjects with an actual artificial limb,
and another with only the accompanying verbal description. Half the
subjects in both evidence categories, demonstrative and verbal, assessed damages against a corporate defendant, and the other half
against an individual. We predicted that the vividness of the prosthetic
limb would significantly increase the award of damages. We also predicted that subjects would award plaintiffs larger sums of money if the
defendant were a corporation, as opposed to an individual. With corporate status removing the "ceiling" from the damages award, we speculated that demonstrative evidence against a corporate defendant
would have an especially pronounced effect.
The first predicted effect, for demonstrative evidence, would reflect
the combination of greater information and increased sympathy resulting from a tangible display of injury. We expected this effect to be
amplified by group decision, because deliberation would give jurors the
opportunity to translate their feelings of pity for the defendant into an
"objective" assessment of his impairment. This is a form of extra-legal
influence discussed above: the close affinity of powerful sentiments to
admissible evidence will allow the jury to express its feelings within the
etiquette of the law.23 4 We expected that this process would receive a
significant boost from group discussion. It should be noted that lIT
would not make a contrary prediction, because the evidentiary aspect
233. Further explanation of the factorial design may be found in almost any introductory
statistics textbook.
234. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 165.
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of the limb presumably would receive greater weight in group discussion that might offset the diminished impact of sympathy.
We were not as confident about the impact of group discussion on
the corporate-status effect. Taking our cue from the studies that have
consistently shown a boomerang effect when instructions specify what
the jury is to ignore,"' we did not instruct our juries to disregard the
defendant's corporate status. We settled for a general instruction 236 to
jurors to consider only the evidence and arguments presented in the
attorney's speeches, speeches which made no reference to corporate status. Thus, many juries may have felt entitled, or at least not forbidden,
to discuss corporate status-the teeth of the law were not closed so
tightly against it. We would not expect much of a "Eureka" effect because discussion of corporate status may not have been an obvious
"mistake." In fact, group consensus could have the opposite effect of
legitimizing the discussion of corporate status. Thus, we did not share
IIT's prediction that deliberation would reduce this bias. We expected
the difference between corporate and individual defendants to remain
after deliberation.
In testing these predictions, we tried to avoid some of the pitfalls of
the trial simulations discussed earlier.23 7 We had our subjects listen to
a tape-recording of speeches made by the opposing attorneys, rather
than read a printed text. Our case was loosely based on an actual civil
trial, 238 and both the arguments used and the evidence presented are
the kinds that would actually be encountered in a personal injury case.
Although we limited the jury's decision to damages by eliminating
the issue of liability, we think this was a very defensible restriction.
The variables manipulated, type of evidence and identity of defendant,
would be expected to have a greater impact on the size of the award
than on the decision of liability. The demonstrative evidence of injury
would have greater relevance for damages, and the defendant's corporate status more equitable significance. If we had our jurors decide the
defendant's liability, we could only guarantee that we would receive
their judgment on damages by asking the difficult subjective question
posed in other studies: 239 Assuming the defendant were liable, how
much would you assess against him for damages? We chose to make
235. Supra notes 199-201.
236. The judicial instructions employed in this simulation represent a synthesis of North Carolina Patterned Jury Instructions §§ 101.20, 105.10, 105.30, and 150.40, adapted to fit the facts of
our case. See NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA
PATTERNED JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES (1975).

237.
238.
239.

See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
Jeffers v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 343965 (Super. Ct. 1946).
E.g., Bray & Noble, supra note 182.
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this concession of liability the operating assumption of our trial, rather
than the premise of a hypothetical question.
Finally, we used deliberating jurors. 240 This was an obvious necessity because we sought to compare group and individual judgments.
But further, we believe the subjects' anticipation of group discussion
probably improved the thoughtfulness of their individual decisions.
Here, without further preface, is our experiment.
A.

Method
1.

Subjects

One hundred nineteen students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill served as
subjects. 24 ' Participation in the study was voluntary, with partial credit
given toward fulfillment of the course requirement. Subjects were run
in twenty-three groups of four to six members per group. A 2 X 2 factorial design was employed, with each subject assigned randomly to
240. Further, our dependent measure was the size of the jury award, not the awards of individual jurors after deliberation. In reviewing studies which have used deliberation, we have not
always distinguished between those which measured group verdicts, e.g., Hans & Doob, supra
note 64; Sonaike, supra note 149; Broeder; supra note 68. and the great majority of others, which
have measured individual judgments after deliberation. There may be at least two reasons for
preferring the latter measure: first, the experimenter may be primarily concerned with the effect of
deliberation on individual judgment (as is the case with lIT research) and second, the use of
groups greatly reduces the number of results and thus the statistical power of the experiment. But
studies using individual response ignore any contribution that might be made by the dynamics of
reaching a collective decision (see the brief discussion of social decision rules at text accompanying notes 117-21 supra), and are, therefore, less complete simulations.
241. As noted above, note 51 supra, Colasanto and Sanders found that conformity to a legal
norm of decision-making was significantly reduced both by omitting deliberation and by using
students, rather than former jurors, to decide the case. These shortcomings, however, were of
unequal magnitude:
[Tihe presence of a deliberation is by far the most crucial aspect of the methodological
design of these experiments. . . . The essence of jury decision-making (as opposed to other
kinds of decision-making) is the use of an imposed theory and definition of responsibility in
determining the guilt of the accused. Our analysis clearly shows that non-deliberators do not
qualify as jurors based on this criterion. ...
According to the criterion of the development and use of an imposed theory of responsibility in the decision-making process, the deliberating jurors and students are somewhat alike.
On this basis, we might conclude that, in the interest of minimizing the costs of jury experiments, it would be reasonable to let social psychologists continue to use students as subjects in
their research as long as these subjects are allowed to deliberate.
Colasanto & Sanders, supra note 46, at 26. Colasanto and Sanders qualify this conclusion by
noting: "[S]tudents are more likely to incorporate their own ideas about 'justice' into the decisionmaking process and are more likely to reject the legal guidelines for decisions when they run
counter to their own values." Id. at 27.
For a relatively modest experiment such as our own, the cost of recruiting non-students as
jurors would have been prohibitive. Our principle manipulation concerned vividness, and we
doubt that student "nullification" of legal restrictions would have made much difference here. We
readily concede, however, that the effect we found for the corporate status of the defendant might
not have been so pronounced if we had not used students.
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one of the four conditions: individual-demonstrative, individual-verbal, corporation-demonstrative, and corporation-verbal.
2.

Procedure

Upon entering the experimental room, subjects sat in two rows of
three chairs, arranged to simulate a small jury box. The chairs faced a
long table containing a tape recorder, stacks of questionnaires and
handouts, and an artificial leg that was wrapped in a plastic bag and
white sheet, and partially hidden from the subjects' view. After five
minutes to allow for late arrivals, the experiment began. Each student
was handed a mimeographed sheet entitled "Interaction Patterns of
Civil Juries, "242 and was told that the handout "should be self-explanatory." The subjects were asked to "read it through a couple of times to
make sure you understand what you are to do. If you have any questions, I will answer them at that time." The handout stated that the
study was "investigating the various ways in which members of a civil
jury interact when faced with the task of reaching a decision in a civil
case." It added that civil juries usually decide whether the defendant is
responsible for the civil injury which he has caused, and if so, how
much he should pay the plaintiff for damages. It was noted that in this
case, however, the defendant had admitted responsibility, and thus the
subjects' only task was to decide on the monetary award the plaintiff
should receive. The handout also stated that the subjects were to listen
to a tape-recorded portion of a transcript of a trial, 24 3 and that after
hearing the evidence presented on the tape, they would be asked to
"decide on the monetary award you think the plaintiff should receive."
Subjects were asked, however, to base their decisions "only on the evidence you are about to hear, disregarding any evidence you think
should be considered."
Following the instructions, the subjects read a brief summary of the
case. All handouts were identical, with the exception of the identity of
the defendant, which was revealed in the case title and in the last sentence of the case summary. 2 " The defendant, Holden, was identified
as either Jack Holden or Holden Industries, Incorporated. All handouts contained identical facts: as the result of negligence on the part of
Holden, John Blake, the plaintiff, had sustained a severe leg injury that
required the amputation of his left leg.
Following the case summary was a reminder that Holden had admitted full responsibility for the accident, and that the subjects' task was to
decide upon the amount of money Blake should be awarded for dam242. See appendices II & III infra.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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ages. The handout further instructed the subjects that the first voice on
the tape would be Holden's attorney, 24 5 the second voice would 2be
47
Blake's attorney, 24 6 and the third voice would be the judge's,
presenting instructions on how to use the evidence presented.
After allowing the subjects five minutes to read, the handouts were
collected and the subjects were asked if everything was clear and understandable. After being assured that the subjects understood the
task, the experimenter reminded the subjects of the order of voices on
the tape and asked them to recall that they were to base their decision
only upon the evidence presented on the tape. They were then informed, depending upon the condition, that Holden was either "an average man with a family of three, holds no insurance policy, and earns
about $30,000 a year," or "an average corporation, with assets totalling
about $2 million at the end of the last fiscal year." The experimenter
then turned on a Califone reel-to-reel tape recorder and sat down on
the table next to the recorder, pretending to be listening carefully to
what was on the tape.
The taped presentation of the attorneys' speeches and judge's instructions was the same for all conditions. 24 8 For the demonstrative
conditions, however, the tape recorder was shut off about two-thirds of
the way through Blake's attorney's presentation, and the artificial leg
was presented to the subjects. This was accomplished by having the
experimenter cut off the tape recorder, walk to the back of the long
table where the artificial leg lay, and bring it over to where the subjects
were seated. While unwrapping the leg from the plastic bag and white
sheet that covered it, the experimenter made the following remarks:
This is an artificial leg very similar to the one that Blake's attorney is
talking about, and very similar to the one that Blake will have to wear
for the rest of his life. I would like for you [the subject in the front lefthand seat] to examine this as closely as you like and then pass it on to
the other members of the jury.
After each subject had examined the leg, which in total required approximately two minutes, the experimenter wrapped the leg in the
white sheet, returned it to its original place, and turned on the tape
recorder again. Blake's attorney then finished his speech, as did the
judge, who asked the jury to return a majority verdict. The scheduling
of the experiment did not permit us to budget the extra time we anticipated it would require for most juries to reach a unanimous verdict.
The tape played for approximately seven minutes, with Holden's attorney's speech lasting approximately two minutes and forty-five seconds,
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See appendices IV, V, & V1 infra.
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Blake's attorney's speech about two minutes and five seconds (excluding the leg examination time in the demonstrative conditions), and the
judge's instructions lasting about one minute. Between each voice
there was a fifteen-second pause. At the conclusion of the tape, the
experimenter reminded the subjects of the nature of their task, and then
asked them to step into an adjacent "deliberation" room.
Subjects seated themselves around a three by six and one-half foot
rectangular table, with three chairs on each side. The experimenter
then handed each subject an award questionnaire2 49 and stated:
"Before you deliberate, I would like for you to decide individually how
much you would award Blake." The questionnaires contained a scale
from $0 to $150,000, marked off in increments of $5,000, and subjects
were asked to make a mark on the scale that corresponded to the award
they thought Blake should receive. 250 The experimenter then collected
the questionnaires and informed the subjects:
Take about ten to fifteen minutes and seriously weigh and discuss the
evidence that you have just heard. Then, by majority vote, decide on
an award you think Blake should receive for damages. When you have
done that, someone just mark it down on this sheet, 25 ' and then remain
in here until I return for your decision.
The experimenter then closed the door and returned to the original experimental room, where he busied himself with administrative duties.
Most groups deliberated for approximately ten to twelve minutes,
with some taking only five; others required the full fifteen minutes allowed. The experimenter could hear the subjects deliberating in the
next room, however, and was quick to re-enter when they finished because there were other questionnaires to be administered. Upon entering the room, the experimenter collected the jury award questionnaire
and distributed a qualitative questionnaire, which the subjects answered individually in the experimenter's presence.
The qualitative questionnaire 2 52 contained questions concerning the
emotionally-arousing qualities of each attorney's presentation of evidence,2 5 3 the seriousness with which the subjects assumed their role as
jurors, 25 and a question that would possibly shed some light on the
probative value of the presentation of the artificial leg. 255 Interspersed
among these queries were filler questions concerning communication
between jurors. Questionnaires for all groups were identical, with the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See appendices VII & VIII infra.
Id.
See appendix IX infra.
See appendices IX & X infra.
Id
Id.
Id.
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exception of one question: 25 6 for demonstrative conditions, subjects
were questioned on the probative value of the actual presentation of an
artificial leg; for verbal conditions, subjects were questioned on how
probative the presentation of an artificial leg would have been had it
been presented as evidence. After collecting the questionnaires, the experimenter invited questions and comments, debriefed the subjects,
and dismissed them.
B.

Results

As noted above, when psychologists want to test the effects of two or
more factors on certain groups of subjects-here, what effects the nature of the evidence and the status of the defendant may have on jurors-they use a factorial design. Since our experiment involves two
factors (type of evidence and defendant identity), with two levels for
each factor (demonstrative and verbal evidence, and individual and
corporate defendants), we have four separate groups, or cells, in our
design: demonstrative-individual, demonstrative-corporation, verbalindividual, and verbal-corporation. As we also noted earlier, the purpose of such a design is to enable researchers to determine the contribution of each factor to the dependent measure obtained. For example, in
the demonstrative-corporation cell, subjects awarded the plaintiff a significantly larger amount of money than in the verbal-individual cell.
The question then arises: What caused such a difference? The defendant's status as a corporation rather than an individual, or the fact that
the subjects saw the artificial leg instead of just heard about it, or both?
To determine the answers to questions such as these, researchers often
employ a statistical test known as the analysis of variance.
Briefly, analysis of variance involves a determination of the extent to
which a particular factor is causing the scores between groups to vary.
For example, in our experiment, scores (monetary awards) in the demonstrative groups were higher than scores in the verbal groups. In
this instance, an analysis of variance test (an ANOVA test) enabled us
to determine whether the differences in the type of evidence were causing this variance in scores.
In such an experiment, not only can scores vary between groups, but
they can vary within the groups as well. Thus, the variance in the
scores between the two groups in the previous example may not have
been any greater than the variance within the groups themselves. Were
this so, we could not say that the type of evidence caused the scores to
differ between the two groups, because they differed just as much
within the groups themselves, a difference due only to chance. The ob256.

Compare appendix IX with appendix X infra (specifically, question five).
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served difference between the two groups would be no greater than the
chance difference within each group, so we could not conclude that the
former was due to the type of evidence. The analysis of variance test
compares the variance in scores between two or more groups with the
variance in scores within the groups, to determine whether the factor in
question makes a difference that cannot be due to chance. When the
variance within groups is low and the variance between groups is high,
one can be confident in assuming that the factor examined is responsible for the difference in the scores between the groups. Because subjects within each group received the same experimental treatment and
gave roughly the same award to the plaintiff; any difference between
groups must be due to different treatments (for example, demonstrative
treatment, as opposed to verbal treatment).
Because all subjects bring to the experiment something that the researcher cannot control-their backgrounds and personalities-there
will always be some variance in scores within groups. This withingroup variance provides a measure by which we may assess the
probability that the observed differences between groups are also due
only to these uncontrolled factors-to chance. The smaller the effect of
uncontrolled factors, the smaller the within-group variance; thus, the
greater the probability that a given difference between groups is not
due to chance. When the probability that the between-group differences
are due to chance falls below five per cent social scientists are willing to
assert that the results are due to the factors manipulated. A significance level of less than .05 (expressed as 'p < .05")indicates that there
is a less than five per cent chance that the results occurred not because
of the factor manipulated, but merely because of chance. Thus, the
lower the significance level (thep value), the higher the probability that
the results obtained are due to the factors manipulated. With this brief
background, we now turn to the results of our experiment.
Each of the dependent measures in this 2 x 2 factorial design was
subjected to a two-way analysis of variance.2 57 The means (the total
scores divided by the number of subjects) and standard deviations (a
measure of the within group variance) for pre-deliberation awards of
individual jurors are presented in Table 1. Regarding the amount of
money awarded to the plaintiff, results of the analysis of variance indicated a main effect for identity of the defendant, p < .001, with the
plaintiff receiving a significantly greater amount of money when the
defendant was a corporation. There was also a main effect for the type
of evidence, p < .002, with the plaintiff receiving a significantly larger
257. Treatment of this nonorthogonal design (different number of subjects in the four conditions) was in accordance with the procedures recommended by Appelbaum & Cramer, Some
Problems in the NonorthogonalAnalysis of Variance, 81 PSYCH. BULL. 335 (1974).
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award when the jurors were presented the actual artificial leg. The interaction, however, only approached significance, p < .130.
TABLE I
Pre-deliberation Awards for Individual Jurors
Type of Evidence**

Identity of the Defendant*
Individual
Corporation
M = $73,257.562

M = $114,310.375

Demonstrative

S.D. - 37523.324

S.D. = 38654.203

Verbal

(N = 33)
M = $62,500.035
S.D. = 36748.852

(N =29)
M = $83,666.687
S.D. = 28037.297

(N = 27)

(N = 30)

*p < .001
**p < .002
p < .130 (defendant x evidence interaction)

TABLE 2
Post-deliberation Jury Awards
Type of Evidence**

Identity of the Defendant*
Individual
Corporation
M = $135,000.000
S.D. = 13165.051

Demonstrative

M = $75,833.312
S.D. = 14634.540

(N = 6)

(N = 5)

Verbal

M = $68,333.312
S.D. = 20065.969

M = 79,166.625
S.D. = 17151.293

(N = 6)

(N = 6)

*p < .001
**p < .001

p < .003 (defendant x evidence interaction)

Similar results were obtained for the post-deliberation jury awards,
as shown in Table 2. The results indicated a significant main effect for
identity of the defendant, p < .001, and for type of evidence, p < .001.
For jury awards, however, there was also a significant interaction, 258 p
< .003.
258. An interaction is a result that could not be predicted merely by adding the separate effects
of each factor. Where there is an interaction, the result is determined not merely by the level of
each factor, but by their particular combination.
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As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, post-deliberation jury awards were
greater than pre-deliberation individual awards in every condition except corporation-verbal. A grand means test of the difference scores
between the mean juror award and the jury award for each of the
twenty-three juries indicated that this difference was greater than zero,
with juries awarding larger sums, F(l, 19) = 6.450,p < .020. An analysis of variance of these difference scores indicated a main effect for type
of evidence, p < .027, and a significant interaction, p < .001.
An analysis of variance was also performed on the qualitative questionnaire data. For question 2, concerning the emotional arousal engendered by Holden's attorney's presentation of evidence, a marginally
significant main effect was revealed for identity of the defendant, p <
.066, with subjects perceiving Holden's attorney's presentation as less
emotionally arousing when Holden was a corporation. 259 For question
3, concerning the emotional arousal engendered by Blake's attorney's
presentation of evidence, a significant main effect was found for type of
evidence, p < .0 13, where subjects perceived Blake's attorney's presentation as more emotionally arousing when they were presented with the
actual artificial leg.26 ° It is also important to note that there were no
significant differences between conditions concerning the reported seriousness with which subjects assumed their role as jurors. 26 ' An important finding was that there were no significant differences in the
probative value scores for the presentation of an artificial leg, regardless of whether the subjects actually saw the leg.262 The demonstrative
conditions displayed slightly, but not significantly higher, means.
A grand means test was also performed on the difference scores between the emotional arousal scores reported for Holden's and Blake's
attorneys. 263 The test revealed that this difference was significantly
greater than zero, p < .001, with Blake's attorney's presentation of evidence being perceived as more emotionally arousing. An analysis of
variance of these difference scores reveals a significant main effect for
identity of the defendant, p < .033, with subjects perceiving Blake's
attorney's presentation of evidence as more emotionally arousing when
Holden was a corporation. The main effect for type of evidence, however, only approached significance, p < .118.
C.

Discussion

The results indicated that, other variables being equal, subjects ex259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See appendices IX & X (question 2).
Id. (question 3).
Id. (question 7).
Id. (question 5).
See appendix I infra.
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posed to an actual artificial leg awarded significantly larger amounts of
money than subjects who were not. These results support earlier research by Oliver and Griffitt2 64 and are perhaps accounted for by the
vivid imagery aroused by this type of demonstrative evidence. The
sensory experience one receives from touching and handling an artificial leg presumably makes one more keenly aware of what it must be
like to actually wear one, and far more aware than one would be by
merely listening to someone describe what it is like. Although the results indicated that the demonstrative evidence presentation was more
emotionally arousing than the verbal presentation, it is by no means
clear that the sensory experience the subjects received from handling
the leg aroused their emotions to such an extent that they were no
longer fair and impartial. In this study, an attempt was made to evaluate the probative value of a supposedly emotion-arousing piece of evidence. While the null hypothesis cannot be proven, it is worth noting
that subjects who saw the artificial leg, and those who did not, did not
differ significantly on the question of the leg's probative value: both
reported that the leg had, or would have had, high probative value.
Further indication of this was obtained in post-experimental discussion, where subjects in the verbal conditions were shown the artificial
leg and reported that had they seen the leg earlier, they would have
awarded a larger sum of money.
The results also indicated that when the defendant was a corporation, subjects awarded the plaintiff significantly larger amounts of
money. These results support earlier research by Smigel. 265 Perhaps
this phenomenon is attributable to the anonymous and impersonal nature of a corporation, which spared subjects the unpleasant task of balancing hardships between two individuals. The wealth and anonymity
of the corporate defendant allowed the jurors to give full expression to
their concern for the plaintiffs loss. In the words of many subjects,
"They can afford it." It is interesting to note that subjects perceived
Holden's attorney's presentation of evidence as less emotionally arousing when Holden was a corporation. Although the effect was marginal
(p < .066), it suggests that subjects' perceptions of the same presentation of evidence were altered by the identity of the defendant for whom
the attorney was pleading. Not only did the identity of the defendant
affect subjects' perceptions of the defendant's attorney's presentation of
evidence, but it affected their perceptions of the plaintiffs presentation
as well. Subjects perceived the plaintiffs attorney's presentation of evidence as more emotionally arousing when the defendant was a corporation, regardless of whether the evidence was demonstrative or verbal.
264. See Oliver & Griffitt, supra note 225.
265. See Smigel, supra note 230.
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Thus, subjects appeared to give less weight to the arguments of an unsympathetic defendant and more to the arguments of his opponent, accommodating their biases in a manner similar to Hans and Doob's
jurors.2 6 6

The two factors investigated, type of evidence and identity of the
defendant, strongly interacted. This interaction was especially manifest
in the corporation-demonstrative condition, where these two factors
combined to produce an award substantially greater than those of the
other conditions. It was also manifest in the difference scores between
the mean juror award and the jury award for the corporate-demonstrative condition. Here, the two factors combined to produce a substantially greater increase from mean juror to jury awards than the
increases in the individual-demonstrative and individual-verbal conditions.26 7
As anticipated, the significant effects found for the type of evidence
and the identity of the defendant remained after deliberation. Only the
effect of the evidence was significantly increased by deliberation, however. This suggests that not all values which have a powerful influence
on individual decisions will be affected by group discussion in the same
way, or to the same extent. Because corporate status had such a pronounced effect on individual judgments, group consensus apparently
was not needed to legitimize its consideration. But the group did have
a distinct role to play in enhancing the impact of demonstrative evidence. Each member of the group had acquired strong visual and tactile impressions of the prosthetic limb. Pooling these impressions
would have intensified their emotional impact and provided the "objective" evidence necessary to support a suitable enlarged verdict. In addition, the emotional impact of the limb might have made the majority
more determined to "pull up" the less generous members of the jury. It
is unlikely that the majority would be so strongly motivated by the
mere revelation of the defendant's corporate assets. We can only speculate about how group processes actually contributed to the verdicts we
obtained, but the possibilities are intriguing.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As a final note, we would like to suggest a fairly ambitious program
of applied research. The study we have just presented compared the
effects of only two factors on individual and group verdicts: the vividness of the evidence and the corporate status of the defendant. We
selected these factors because they appeared to have a significant role
266. See Hans & Doob, supra note 64; Doob, supra note 65, at 142.
267. Compare table I with table 2 in text.
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in civil trials, and because they lent themselves to experimental manipulation. Our belief in their significance was only speculation, but speculation based on courtroom lore, judicial opinion, and a handful of
trial simulations.2 68 For criminal trials, the psychologist need not rely
on his hunches; The American Jury contains a comprehensive review of
evidentiary and non-evidentiary factors known to cause judge-jury disagreements. 26 ' As argued earlier, the data which Kalven and Zeisel
have presented afford no means to establish the role that group decision-making plays in creating or limiting these differences, and thus
leave a question that invites experimental investigation.270
It would be worthwhile to explore the extent to which judge-jury disagreements are the result of differences between individual and group
decision-making, as opposed to the differences between amateur and
professional decision-makers. One field study reported that decisionmaking by three-judge panels may polarize the civil-libertarian values
of individual judges, suggesting that expert, as well as lay, decisionmakers may be strongly influenced by group processes. 27 ' A series of
experiments could examine the differential affect on individuals and
deliberating groups of the various legal and extra-legal factors revealed
by Kalven and Zeisel to be sources of judge-jury disagreement. To the
extent that deliberating groups were more influenced by these factors
than individuals, there would be evidence that judge-jury divergence
resulted from differences in the form of decision-making as well as the
training and experience of the factfinders. To the extent that individuals were more influenced by these factors than groups, it would appear
that group decision-making itself was an effective form of jury control.
Either finding would challenge the hunch that deliberation plays a negligible role in establishing the distinctive character of jury decisions.

268. See text accompanying notes 218-32 supra.
269. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7.
270. See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
271. Walker & Main, Choice Shifts in Political Decisionmaking: Federal Judges and Civil Liberties Cases, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 39 (1973).
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Appendix I
Means, Standard Deviations, and Difference Scores for
Emotional Arousal of Defendant's and Plaintiffs
Presentation of Evidence
Question 2
Defendant's
Attorney
M = 4.333
S.D. = 2.470
(N = 33)
M = 3.777
S.D. = 2.063
(N = 27)

Question 3
Plaintiffs
Attorney
M = 6.515
S.D. = 1.804
(N = 33)
M = 5.814
S.D. = 2.236
(N = 27)

corporation-demonstrative

M = 3.034
S.D. = 2.179
(N = 30)

M = 7.068
S.D. = 1.70
(N = 30)

-4.034
S.D. = 3.267

corporation-verbal

M = 3.600
S.D. = 2.143
(N = 30)

M = 6.066
S.D. = 1.529
(N = 30)

-2.466
S.D. = 2.330

Condition
Defendant I.D.**
Type of Evidence'
individual-demonstrative

individual-verbal

Difference*
-2.181
S.D. = 3.330
-2.037
S.D. = 2.695

p < .001
*p*

< .033

**p< .118

Appendix II
Interaction Patterns of Civil Juries
This is a study investigating the various ways in which members of a civil
jury interact when faced with the task of reaching a decision in a civil case. In
most cases, the jury's job consists of two pans: 1) determining whether the
defendant is responsible for the civil offense with which he is charged, and 2) if
the defendant is responsible, deciding on the appropriate amount of money
that he should pay the plaintiff for damages. In some cases, however, the defendant admits responsibility, and thus, the jury's only task is to decide on the
appropriate amount of money the plaintiff should receive for his damages.
This latter type, where the defendant has admitted responsibility, is the type
of case that you will hear shortly. Here you are to pretend that you are a
member of a real jury and are asked to decide the amount of money the plaintiff should receive. You will first read a brief summary of the case. Following
this, you will listen to a presentation of evidence upon which you will base
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your decision concerning the amount of money the plaintiff should receive.
Although this presentation will be brief and represents only a portion of the
total evidence normally presented in a civil trial, you should base your decision only on the evidence you are about to hear, disregarding any evidence
you think should be considered. After hearing the presentation of evidence
and the judge's instructions about how you should use this evidence, you will
then decide on the monetary award you think the plaintiff should receive.
Blake v. Holden
The following is an excerpt from a civil trial involving the plaintiff, John
Blake, and the defendant, Jack Holden. In this trial, Blake is suing Holden for
damages resulting from negligence on the part of Holden.
On Wednesday, January 16, 1977, John Blake, an employee of
Reston Construction Company, finished work at approximately 5:30
p.m. and began walking to his car, which was parked at the bottom of a
gradual incline. As Blake was crossing in front of his car to enter
through the driver's side, the parking brake of a car some 50 feet up the
hill from Blake gave away and the car started rolling toward Blake.
Blake did not see the other car, however, and as he turned the corner of
his car, the other car crashed into Blake's car, pinning his left leg between the two cars. Subsequently, Blake's left leg had to be amputated
approximately six inches below the hip. Jack Holden, owner of the
other car, claimed full responsibility for the accident because he knew
beforehand of the poor condiltion of the parking brake, and therefore
admitted being negligent in parking the car at the top of a hill.
Holden has claimed full responsibility for the accident, and it is now up to
you to decide the amount of money that Blake should be awarded for damages. You will base your decision only upon the evidence that you are about
to hear. The first voice you hear will be that of Holden's attorney; the second
voice you hear will be that of Blake's attorney; and finally, the third voice you
hear will be that of the judge, giving you instructions as to how you should use
the evidence that you are presented.

Appendix III
Interaction Patterns of Civil Juries
This is a study investigating the various ways in which members of a civil
jury interact when faced with the task of reaching a decision in a civil case. In
most cases, the jury's job consists of two parts: 1) determining whether the
defendant is responsible for the civil offense with which he is charged, and 2) if
the defendant is responsible, deciding on the appropriate amount of money
that he should pay the plaintiff for damages. In some cases, however, the de-
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fendant admits responsibility, and thus, the jury's only task is to decide on the
appropriate amount of money the plaintiff should receive for his damages.
This latter type, where the defendant has admitted responsibility, is the type
of case that you will hear shortly. Here, you are to pretend that you are a
member of a real jury and are asked to decide the amount of money the plaintiff should receive. You will first read a brief summary of the case. Following
this, you will listen to a presentation of evidence upon which you will base
your decision concerning the amount of money the plaintiff should receive.
Although this presentation will be brief and represents only a portion of the
total evidence normally presented in a civil trial, you should base your decision only on the evidence you are about to hear, disregarding any evidence
you think should be considered. After hearing the presentation of evidence
and the judge's instructions about how you should use this evidence, you will
then decide on the monetary award you think the plaintiff should receive.
Blake v. Holden Industries, Incorporated
The following is an excerpt from a civil trial involving the plaintiff, John
Blake, and the defendant, Holden Industries, Inc. In this trial, Blake is suing
Holden for damages resulting from negligence on the part of Holden.
On Wednesday, January 16, 1977, John Blake, an employee of
Reston Construction Company, finished work at approximately 5:30
p.m. and began walking to his car which was parked at the bottom of a
gradual incline. As Blake was crossing in front of his car to enter
through the driver's side, the parking brake of a car some 50 feet up the
hill from Blake gave away and the car started rolling toward Blake.
Blake did not see the other car, however, and as he turned the corner of
his car, the other car crashed into Blake's car, pinning his left leg between the two cars. Subsequently, Blake's left leg had to be amputated
approximately six inches below the hip. Holden Industries, Inc., manufacturer of the parking brake system in the moving car, claimed full
responsibility for the accident, as the brake system contained defective
parts which prevented it from functioning properly.
Holden has claimed full responsibility for the accident, and it is now up to
you to decide the amount of money that Blake should be awarded for damages. You will base your decision only upon the evidence that you are about
to hear. The first voice you hear will be that of Holden's attorney; the second
voice you hear will be that of Blake's attorney; and finally, the third voice you
hear will be that of a judge, giving you instructions as to how you should use
the evidence that you are presented.
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Appendix IV
Holden's Attorney:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Let me first say that I am very sorry that
Mr. Blake lost his leg. Any time a human being has to undergo an experience
as shocking as a loss of a limb, it is very heartbreaking and tragic indeed. Not
too long ago, when a man lost his leg he was confined to a wheelchair for the
rest of his life-never again able to stroll through the park or move around
freely as you or I do.
Today, however, things are different. Thanks to modern technology, when
someone loses a limb now, a person can wear an artificial limb that is almost
as good as the real thing-in some ways even better. Today, amputees who
are properly fitted with a modern artificial limb can do practically everything a
person with a normal limb can do: they can swim, dance, ride horses, drive
cars, play bridge, tie neckties-almost everything they could do before they
lost their limbs. Thanks to modem science, a person can have the kind of
tragic experience Mr. Blake had and still have everything restored to almost
exactly what it was before.
Of course, it will take Mr. Blake a little time to adjust to having an artificial
leg instead of a real one-but this will come in time. I am prepared at this
moment to put on the stand dozens of amputees who will testify that once they
got used to their artificial limbs, it seemed as if nothing had ever happened.
Therefore, I ask you, as members of the jury, to think reasonably about this
issue before you decide how much Mr. Blake should be compensated for his
damages. Certainly, he should receive some reasonable amount for his medical expenses and for his time away from work-all totaled this is about $6,000.
Thus, I think that an award of $10,000 is clearly a generous offer. But to
severely punish Holden for removing Mr. Blake from society would be a grave
injustice. For as we have seen, Mr. Blake will not be removed from society,
but will be able to function almost as normally as he used to. Therefore, I ask
you to think of this issue not merely in terms of Blake, but in terms of Holden
as well-who is indeed very sorry and grieved, and is willing to pay for all
medical expenses and for the loss of time on the job that Mr. Blake has incurred. Thank you very much."

Appendix V
Blake's Attorney:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I must say that the counsel for the defense did an admirable job of enlightening us on the progress of modem science. Yes, sir, our technology has progressed to the point where we can now
replace a lost limb with an artificial one that is almost every bit as good as the
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real thing. But what exactly is this marvelous scientific invention? How many
of you have ever actually seen one of these lovely products of our technology?
The counsel for the defense has shown us that amputees can do practically
everything that a person with a normal limb can do: drive cars, dance, ride
horses--even swim. In fact, she claims that once one gets used to having an
artifical limb, one is hardly even aware that it is artificial. Thus, all my client
needs to do is to be properly fitted for an artificial leg, and things will be
almost back to normal.
But I ask you, is it almost back to normal when my client has to get up each
morning and strap on his leg? Is it almost back to normal when my client can
barely walk in cold weather because the stainless steel, rust-proof joints become cold and hard to move? Is it almost back to normal when on his stroll
through the park my client has to exert nearly twice the normal effort in order
to throw his wooden foot in front of his body? These are but a few of the
experiences that my client will have to go through for the rest of his life. These
are the experiences that are made possible by this (slight emphasis) great technological achievement.
(three second pause)
As you can see, this marvelous invention is a far cry from the real flesh-andblood human limb. My client will have to wear one of these lovely devices for
the rest of his life. I am not here to seek punishment for Holden. All I am
asking is that you think carefully about the amount of compensation Blake
should receive for having to strap on one of those unwieldly contraptions
every morning for the rest of his life. With the above considerations in mind, I
do not feel that an award of at least $150,000 is too much to ask as compensation for a loss as great as that of a leg. Thank you very much."

Appendix VI
Judge
"Now, members of the jury, you have heard the evidence and the arguments
of counsel for the plaintiff and for the defendant. It is your duty to consider
all the evidencei arguments, contentions, and positions urged by the attorneys
in their speeches to you, and to weigh them in the light of your common sense,
and as best you can, to determine the appropriate award that should be rendered in this case. You are the sole judges of the weight to be given any evidence. By this I mean that if you decide certain evidence is believable, you
must then determine the importance of that evidence in light of all other believable evidence in the case.
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Now, members of the jury, you may retire and select one of your members
as foreman to lead you in your deliberations. You may render an appropriate
award by majority vote. When you have decided on an amount you deem
suitable, you may return to the courtroom to pronounce your decision."

Appendix VII
1.

If you were a real juror in this trial, how much money would you award
the plaintiff, John Blake? (Make a mark on the scale below.)
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Appendix VIII
If you were a real jury in this trial, how much money would you award the
plaintiff, John Blake? (Make a mark on the scale below.)

1.
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Appendix IX
Interaction Patterns of Civil Juries
Please circle the number which most closely approximates your response to
each question.
1. How did group deliberation affect your initial opinion about the amount
of money that Blake should receive?
decreased the amount 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 increased the amount
2. How emotionally arousing was the evidence presented by Holden's attorney?
(Recall that her evidence de-emphasized the disadvantages of having an
artificial leg)
aroused very little
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very emotionally
emotion
arousing
3. How emotionally arousing was the evidence presented by Blake's attorney?
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(Recall that his evidence emphasized the disadvantages of having an artificial leg)
very emotionally
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
aroused very little
arousing
emotion
4. How well were you able to communicate to other jurors what you perceived to be the essential points of the evidence presented?
very clearly
very unclearly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
In your opinion, do you feel that the presentation of an actual artificial leg
demonstrated characteristics of this leg that you would not have been
aware of had the leg only been talked about?

5.

made me more
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
did not make me
aware
more aware
6. How many other members of your jury do you believe hold your opinion
about the amount of money that should be awarded?
1 2
7.

3

4

5

How seriously do you feel that you took your role as a juror?
not very seriously

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

very seriously

Appendix X
Interaction Patterns of Civil Juries
Please circle the number which most closely approximates your response to
each question.
1. How did group deliberations affect your initial opinion about the amount
of money that Blake should receive?
decreased the amount
2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 increased the amount

How emotionally arousing was the evidence presented by Holden's attorney?
(Recall that her evidence de-emphasized the disadvantages of having an
artificial leg)
aroused very little
emotion

3.

1 2

1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

very emotionally
arousing

How emotionally arousing was the evidence presented by Blake's attorney?
(Recall that his evidence emphasized the disadvantages of having an artificial leg)
aroused very little
emotion

1 2

3
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4.

159

How well were you able to communicate to other jurors what you
perceived to be the essential points of the evidence presented?
very unclearly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

very clearly

5.

In your opinion, do you feel that the presentation of an actual artificial leg
would have demonstrated characteristics of this leg that you were not
made aware of by only a verbal presentation of the leg?
would not have made 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
would have made
me more aware
me more aware
6. How many other members of your jury do you believe hold your opinion
about the amount of money that should be awarded?
1 2 3 4 5
7. How seriously do you feel you took your role as a juror?
not very seriously
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
very seriously
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